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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Industry Convergence is impacting multi-billion dollar markets including at least 50% of 
top 500 firms’ industries in the U.S. Yet, this phenomenon is underdeveloped in both theorizing 
and operationalization. A limited research on convergence almost exclusively focuses on macro-
level structure changes, while we know little about strategic implications of firm-level 
entrepreneurial actions in this context.  Until two or more industries converge, they can be easily 
differentiated; where they converge, there is neither one nor another but only a new industry. 
This presents a unique context for advancing the understanding of our theories as well as 
managerial practices.  I structure my dissertation into two essays to explore two sets of firm-level 
actions.  My first essay examines the sequential relationship between alliance experience and 
interindustry initial acquisitions. Building on organizational learning and resource dependence 
theory, this study reveals the condition that firms do not rely on alliance to make subsequent 
acquisition.  In my second essay, I propose that firms need to develop a deep depth of field (i.e. 
competing with a great number of heterogeneous competitors) in order to sustain performance 
during an era of convergence.  A deep depth of field is analogous to a picture in which the 
foreground and background are both in focus.  Using product market competition among firms in 
the telecommunications equipment and computer networking industries during the 1991-2003 
period, I validate this argument.  With the depth of field construct, this study bridges the 
attention-based view and industry evolution research. I also create two empirical indicators for 
measuring the extent and the locus of industry convergence.  
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
Industry convergence (IC) is the blurring of industry boundaries between previously separate 
industries where their respective firms did not compete with one another.  A conservative 
estimate of the breadth and financial impact of IC suggests that 50% of the industries in which 
the Standard and Poor’s 500 firms compete have either undergone or are undergoing IC. The 
wide range of industries undergoing IC include photo-equipment and consumer electronics 
(Srinivasan, Haunschild, & Grewal, 2007), computer and music distribution (Burgelman & 
Grove, 2007), film and video game (Brookey, 2010), and semiconductor and biotech (Avenel et 
al., 2007). While IC is impacting multi-billion dollar markets, theorizing about the co-evolution 
of industries during IC and the empirical operationalization of IC is underdeveloped in the field 
of management. 
Research has recognized the relevance of industry convergence since it creates 
opportunities for new strategies to emerge, destroys competitive advantages while solidifying 
others, and establishes new institutional arrangements (Bettis, 1998; Hamel & Prahalad, 1996). 
Despite recent interest in IC, the literature has been limited for several critical reasons. First, 
industry evolution studies (e.g. industry life cycle and dominant design) have traditionally 
focused on firm behavior and performance consequences within the relatively well-defined 
boundaries of a given industry (Greenstein & Khanna, 1997). However, as Burgelman & Grove 
(2007) posit, today’s globalizing world is increasingly characterized as converging, such that 
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intra-industry research would no longer be sufficient for understanding converging competitive 
landscapes created by technology substitution/integration, deregulation and changing consumer 
preferences. Second, while a few studies have begun to investigate the phenomenon of IC, they 
have almost exclusively focused on market-level structural dynamics (Katz, 1996; Wirtz, 2001), 
the strategic implications of firm-level entrepreneurial action and how the actions impact their 
competitive advantages have been largely downplayed. Third, valid and reliable empirical 
indicators of IC have not emerged. Most of IC studies are either conceptual papers or anecdotal 
stories with two exceptional papers that focus on empirics in the aspects of new product 
introduction (Srinivasan et al., 2007) and diversification (Burgelman & Grove, 2007). 
Nevertheless, both of them did not develop operationalization for IC. The paucity of such studies 
severely limits our understanding of the process through which convergence unfolds. 
1.1 POSITIONING INDUSTRY CONVERGENCE WITHIN THE CONVERGENCE 
LITERATURE 
In the modern era of business, one of the more recent conceptualization of convergence 
originated in the late 1970s. In 1977, Nippon Electric Company (NEC) articulated a vision of 
convergence between communication networks and computers (cf. Yoffie, 1997). In 1978, 
Nicholas Negroponte, founder and chairman of MIT Media Lab, used an illustration of three 
overlapping sectors (computing, publishing/printing, and broadcasting) moving together and 
suggested that the phenomenon is an important research agenda. Rosenberg (1976), analyzing 
the evolution of machine tool, sewing machine and automobile sectors, indicated that increased 
manufacturing productivity was accompanied by the technological convergence in each of the 
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industries. The term ‘convergence’ has taken on a variety of meanings primarily representing 
some combination of technology, product/services and industry convergence. In other words, 
while we are in an era of convergence there are a variety of perspectives as to “what it is” 
It is important to place IC within the context of the broader convergence literature. In 
addition to IC, two forms of convergence have been documented in the literature: technology and 
product/service convergence. Technology convergence is defined as the process by which 
different industries come to share similar technology bases (Gambardella & Torri, 1998)⎯e.g. 
the television and computer industries share the TFT-LCD display technology. Product/service 
convergence is defined as the process by which products are formed by integrating multiple 
functionalities that previously belonged to different products (Gill, 2008; Han, Chung, & Sohn, 
2009)⎯e.g. the electronic book with a TV-watching/gaming function or the integration of 
internet/cable/phone services.  
Since convergence is a multifaceted and co-evolving phenomenon, it is not surprising 
that our knowledge regarding convergence has accumulated in a fragmented fashion across a 
variety of disciplines including technology, strategy, economics, entrepreneurship and 
marketing. My rationale for focusing on IC is grounded on the competition-based mechanism 
(Hedstrom & Swendberg, 1998).  In essence, the competition mechanism explains why and how 
firms compete within and across industries in their attempt to gain a competitive advantage. 
Thus, the concept of competition or rivalry encompasses both structural (position) and process 
dimensions (Chen, 1996; Scherer & Ross, 1990).  “The essence of rivalry is a striving for 
potentially incompatible positions combined with a clear awareness of the parties involved that 
the positions they seek to attain may be incompatible (Scherer & Ross, 1990, 16). Chen (1996) in 
an influential paper further clarified the competition mechanism by developing a framework 
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linking market commonality and resource similarity which predicts the likelihood of interfirm 
rivalry.  While firms compete on the basis of technologies and products, they do so within the 
context of industries.  Therefore, the selection of IC is appropriate for my purposes. 
1.2 EMPIRICAL CONTEXT 
My empirical setting is the voice-data convergence of the telecommunications equipment and 
computer networking industries between the years 1989-2003. During the 1990s’, the traditional 
technological base (circuit-switching technology) in the telecom equipment industry was 
challenged and subsumed by Internet-protocol-based technology (packet-switching technology). 
Packet-switching technology enabled competition between the two industry’s firms beginning in 
1989. In response to threats and opportunities in the new markets, telecom equipment firms 
initiated alliances, acquisitions, and product market expansion to reduce uncertainty related to 
the unfamiliar computer network context.  At the same time, while computer networking firms 
own core technologies required for competing in the era of convergence, they lacked of valuable 
relationships and channels to major customers in need of new voice-data products. This situation 
induced computer networking firms to take similar actions as telecom equipment firms did. 
From a retrospective view, we have already known that the Internet is the ultimate trend 
and demand for multimedia had an exponential growth in the late 1990s. However, this picture 
for most of telecom and computer firms was not unclear and ambiguous when convergence 
begun. For managers facing those infrastructure changes “within” that period, they have limited 
knowledge of how the new industry worked, how it was changing, and what would happen to 
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key parameters in each of segments and the extent of new entry. Therefore, this context is 
appropriate for examining my research questions and testing my hypotheses. 
1.3 DISSERTATION STRUCTURE: TWO ESSAYS 
My dissertation begins to fill the void mentioned earlier with two empirical studies. I employ 
learning theory as well as cognitive/sociological perspectives to identify strategies for competing 
and navigating the IC world in two topics: alliance/acquisition and managerial attention. 
Essay one focuses on alliance experience effects on initial acquisitions. Entry into a 
converging industry via acquisition (as opposed to internal development) helps capture 
opportunities since it addresses bounded rationality and time compression diseconomies. 
Intriguingly, why do firms make an initial acquisition when the ultimate outcome of convergence 
is still unclear? I argue that when a firm emphasizes inter over intra-industry alliance experience 
it is more likely to initiate an initial acquisition in a converging industry. However, as the extent 
of IC increases, firms become less dependent on leveraging alliance experience in making initial 
acquisitions. In this essay, I create a continuous measure of IC based on product market 
integration of the two converging industries.  
Essay two views strategic decision making through the lens of managerial attention. I 
ask: how do high-performance firms develop an understanding of this ambiguous industry 
convergence context. I argue that firms, which attend to their changing competitive environment 
with a deep focus, perform better than others. A deep focus is analogous to a picture in which the 
foreground and background are both in focus. Using product market competition among firms in 
the telecommunications equipment and computer networking industries during the 1991-2003 
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period, I show that a deep focus is positively related to performance and two additional 
interesting findings: (1) the performance benefit of a deep focus weakens when the firm operates 
in product markets where convergence is occurring and (2) a firm‘s deep focus is not associated 
with performance if most of its competitors have a shallow focus. 
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2.0  ESSAY ONE: HOW INTER-INDUSTRY ALLIANCE EXPERIENCE LEADS TO 
INTER-INDUSTRY ACQUISITIONS 
When the boundaries of industries overlap, collide and converge, creating opportunities and 
threats among firms which previously had not been in competition, resource dependence theory 
(RDT) predicts that firms will engage in strategic action to manage emerging uncertainty and 
resource dependences (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Alliances and acquisitions are two of the most 
employed strategic actions firms use to manage uncertainties since to some degree they absorb 
interdependencies in the external environment. Yet little is known regarding the roles and 
interrelationships between alliances and acquisitions in an industry converging (IC) context 
(Burgelman & Grove, 2007; Stiegliz, 2003). We are motivated to address this gap in the inter-
temporal alliances and acquisitions research stream for two reasons (Porrini, 2004; Zaheer, 
Hernadez & Banerjee, 2010; Lin, Peng, Yang, & Sun, 2009; Shi, Sun, & Prescott, 2012; Zollo & 
Reuer, 2010). First, as an increasing number of firms encounter IC, we examine whether and 
how the predictions of RDT extend to include IC as part of its boundary conditions.  Second, our 
understanding of how firms employ multiple dependence-reducing strategies is underdeveloped 
since studies that include both alliances and acquisitions in their theory and research design is 
relatively new (Yang, Lin & Lin, 2010). Both of our motivations speak to two research directions 
identified by Hillman, Withers and Collins (2009) as promising approaches to enhance the 
resource dependence stream of research.     
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Drawing on RDT and the learning perspective, we examine (1) the inter-temporal 
relationship between alliance experience and initial inter-industry acquisitions in an IC context 
and (2) the direct and moderating effect of extent of industry convergence. According to RDT 
linkages with external others constitutes a form of interdependence and as a result organizational 
survival becomes uncertain (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). IC brings novel forms of 
interdependence by disrupting firms’ industry boundaries and exposing them to new competitors, 
suppliers, customers and stakeholders in the converging industry.  
When considering whether to initiate alliances and acquisitions under conditions of 
uncertainty such as those presented by IC, firms adopt courses of action that promote flexibility 
and minimize risk (Hambrick, Finkelstein, Cho, & Jackson, 2005). While alliances and 
acquisitions share many commonalities, acquisitions require significantly higher levels of 
financial and managerial commitment (Yin & Shanley, 2008).  Thus, firms are initially more 
likely to form alliances and as uncertainties are resolved acquisitions become an equally or more 
attractive option (Porrini, 2004).   
An important contribution of the learning perspective (March, 1991) is the recognition 
that as a consequence of bounded rationality, firm action is typically based on prior experience. 
Intra-industry alliance experience originating from partners within a firm’s core industry results 
in exploitation learning whereas inter-industry alliance experience gained through forming 
alliances with partners from a converging industry involves exploration learning (Lavie & 
Rosenkopf, 2006).2 According to the learning perspective, the degree to which a firm’s alliance 
experience is focused in its core industry versus the converging industry influences subsequent 
acquisition activity.    
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We conceptualize the two types of alliance experience as a relative construct: inter/intra-
industry alliance experience to reflect the fact that due to resource and attention constraints firms 
make explicit trade-offs involving the type of experience to emphasize (Gupta, Smith, & 
Shanley, 2006).  During IC, inter/intra-industry alliance experience exerts two learning-related 
mechanisms; uncertainty reduction and attention diverting; influencing a firm’s likelihood of 
undertaking an initial acquisition in an adjacent converging industry. A firm’s initial inter-
industry acquisition is the first acquisition a firm makes in an adjacent converging industry (Song 
& Walkling, 2000).  
Alliance experience constitutes a form of uncertainty reduction that provides learning about 
a firm's external context. A firm’s exploratory learning in the form of inter-industry alliance 
experience provides valuable declarative (know-what) and procedural (know-how) knowledge 
(Bresman, 2010; Garud, 1997) that sufficiently reduces uncertainties related to the initiation of 
an acquisition. As a result, learning benefits arise from knowledge gained from partner-specific 
interactions and from other forms of external learning that allow an organization to learn about 
key aspects of its environment (Wong, 2004).  The reduction of key external uncertainties, 
explains why a firm’s inter-industry alliance experience exerts a positive influence on the 
likelihood of an initial inter-industry acquisition in the context of IC.  
In contrast a firm’s intra-industry alliance experience decreases the likelihood of an initial 
acquisition in the converging industry due to an attention diverting mechanism (Cyert & March, 
1963; Hedstrom, 1998; Ocasio, 1997). When a firm focuses attention on its core industry, it 
diverts attention from external learning in the adjacent converging industry and thus lowers the 
likelihood of resolving uncertainties regarding the cost/benefits of initiating an initial acquisition. 
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We find strong evidence that a firm’s inter/intra-industry alliance experience positively 
influences the likelihood of making an initial acquisition in the converging industry. 
Inter-temporal alliance-acquisition relationship research has focused on the role of 
contingencies including the nature of acquisition tasks (Zollo and Reuer, 2010), the resolution of 
partner-specific uncertainties (Porrini, 2004; Zaheer et al., 2010), and institutional differences 
(Lin et al., 2009). The extent of IC as a moderator of the relationship has not been examined. In 
this light, our second objective is to understand the direct and moderating impact of the extent of 
IC on the alliance experience–acquisition relationship. IC creates opportunities for new strategies 
to emerge, destroys competitive advantages while solidifying others and establishes new 
institutional arrangements. However, theorizing and empirical analysis in an IC context is 
underdeveloped (Burgelman & Grove, 2007). We offer a novel perspective for conceptualizing 
and opertationalizing the extent of IC defined as the degree of cross-industry product-market 
diversification by the collective set of firms in the converging industries. As the extent of IC 
increases the boundaries between the two or more industries increasingly overlap as well as the 
degree of product coherence among the firms (Li and Greenwood, 2004; Teece, Rumelt, Dosi, 
and Winter, 1994). As the extent of IC increases, and uncertainties are reduced through 
competitive interaction, IC has a direct effect on the likelihood of initiating an initial acquisition 
in the adjacent industry while at the same time the effect of inter/intra industry alliance 
experience remains significant albeit at a lower level. As the extent of IC increases, the positive 
influence of a firm’s inter/intra-industry alliance experience on the likelihood of initiating an 
initial acquisition in the adjacent industry decreases. 
There is substantial evidence that firms undertake a variety of action to manage 
environmental interdependence including acquisitions (Lin et al., 2009), alliances (Park & 
 11 
Mezia, 2005), restructuring the board of directors (Kor & Misangyi, 2008), political action 
(Hillman, Zardkoohi, & Bierman, 1999), and executive succession (Daily, Certo, & Dalton, 
2000). However, RDT research has rarely considered how firms employ multiple 
interdependence-reducing strategies (Hillman et al., 2009). The paucity of such studies severely 
limits our understanding of how different resource dependence strategies influence one another. 
We contribute to the body of resource dependence research by focusing on the inter-temporal 
relationship between inter/intra-industry alliance experience and inter-industry acquisitions. The 
positive inter-temporal relationship between inter/intra-industry alliance experience and the 
likelihood of an initial inter-industry acquisition decreases as the extent of IC increases.  
Many firms are confronted with an era of convergence (Burgelman & Grove, 2007; Lee & 
Olson, 2010). Management research on convergence has focused on either stage-based 
conceptual frameworks or case studies. Complementary research that conceptualizes and 
measures the extent of IC and its impact on strategic relationships is almost nonexistent. We 
begin to fill this void by offering a quantitative indicator of the extent of IC and employ it as an 
independent and moderator of the alliance experience-acquisition relationship. 
2.1 THEORY DEVELOPMENT AND HYPOTHESES 
Building on RDT and the organizational learning perspective, we develop hypotheses explaining 
why a firm’s inter to intra-industry alliance experience precedes its initial inter-industry 
acquisition in an industry convergence (IC) context as well as how the extent of IC has a direct 
and moderating effect on the use of the two uncertainty-reducing strategies. 
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2.1.1 Inter/Intra-Industry Alliance Experience and Initial Acquisition in an IC Context 
From the resource dependence perspective, firms need to interact with their environment 
to secure necessary external resources (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Ulrich and Barney, 1984; 
Hillman et al., 2009). When the environment changes such as during IC it provides opportunities 
for interconnections between previously unconnected firms. The resulting interdependence 
creates uncertainties that are problematic since a firm’s existing routines for anticipating the 
future may not be as relevant in the new context. As Pfeffer and Salancik” (1978: 69) observed, 
“changes can come from anywhere without notice and produce consequences unanticipated by 
those initiating the changes and those experiencing change”. As a result, firms take actions to 
minimize uncertainty and the constraints of interdependence. We focus on alliances and 
acquisitions, two important forms of strategic action firms use to reduce uncertainty (Hitt & 
Tyler, 1991; Harrigan & Newman, 1990; Park & Mezias, 2005). 
Our position is based on three research-grounded premises: (1) when the extent of IC is 
low, alliances in the adjacent converging industry are preferred to acquisitions to manage 
emerging interdependence since they provide access to resources at a lower risk (Yin & Shanley, 
2008), (2) due to bounded rationality and managerial attention constraints a de-emphasis on 
intra-industry alliance experience relative to inter-industry experience facilitates uncertainty-
reducing learning in the converging industry (Ocasio, 1997), (3) uncertainty-reducing inter-
industry alliance experience affects future acquisition activity (Zollo & Reuer, 2010) by 
significantly increasing the likelihood of initiating an acquisition in the converging industry.   
 Both acquisitions and alliances help absorb interdependencies although in differing 
degrees. Acquisitions reduce competitive uncertainties by absorbing current or potential 
competitors. Since firms are not always in a position to reduce interdependence through 
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acquisitions, social coordination with interdependent others via alliances is an alternative for 
managing mutual dependence (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978: 145). Similar to acquisitions, alliances 
provide access to resources but at a lower risk (Yin & Shanley, 2008). Unlike acquisitions, 
however, alliances provide a lower degree of absorption. As a result, alliances provide less 
control over interdependent others than acquisitions.  
When the extent of IC is low, as firms are exposed to new forms of interdependence they 
take action to restore certainty and stability to their environment. In this context, alliances with 
partners in the adjacent industry provide access to a variety of resources and experience that 
reduces uncertainty while providing the additional benefit of investment flexibility. In contrast, 
acquisitions in the converging industry provide more external control by absorbing 
interdependence with potential competitors but at the cost of reduced flexibility.  At a time when 
the extent of IC is low, acquisitions are risky because the competitive landscape is in a state of 
flux (Burgelman & Grove, 2007; Lee & Olson, 2010). Firms are thus more likely to initiate inter-
industry alliances before inter-industry acquisitions. 
Alliance experience builds firm-specific inter-organizational routines that (Zollo, Reurer, 
& Singh, 2002) channels managerial attention (Ocasio, 1997). During IC, emphasizing intra-
industry exploitative alliance experience leads to the refinement of existing capabilities some of 
which are becoming obsolete due to IC, hinders external learning about the adjacent industry due 
to the diversion of attention away from the converging industry, and thus lowers the likelihood of 
initiating an initial acquisition in the adjacent industry (Cohen & Bacdayan, 1994). In contrast, 
emphasizing inter-industry exploratory alliances exposes firms to new learning opportunities 
which require the modification of existing capabilities or the development of new ones that 
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focuses attention on external learning in the converging industry and increases the likelihood of 
an initial acquisition. 
Intra-industry and inter-industry alliance experience are forms of exploitation and 
exploration external learning that influences a firm’s attention and priority structure (Lavie & 
Rosenkopf, 2006). We conceptualize the two types of alliance experience as a continuum where 
there is an explicit attention and resource trade-off between the two activities. Gupta et al. (2006) 
assert that exploration and exploitation should be conceptualized as an integrated (single) 
construct when the following criteria are central to a research question. First, when the resources 
or attention needed to simultaneously pursue exploration and exploitation are scarce, firms must 
decide how to trade-off one activity relative to the other.  In the allocation of resources and 
attention to alliance activity, managers are confronted with constraints given the variety of other 
organizational activities that seek attention and resources. Second, when an activity is located 
within a single domain (e.g. corporate development), exploration and exploitation activities are 
generally mutually exclusive. In other words, the demands of the two activities are often 
inconsistent, cannot be satisfied simultaneously and pursuing conflicting goals results in 
managers attending to their demands sequentially (Cyert & March, 1963).  
When the extent of IC is low, a firm’s alliance portfolio is comprised of relatively more 
intra as compared to inter-industry alliances, since firms tend to form local relationship (repeated 
ties with current partners or a partner’s partners) (Gulati, 1995). When a firm emphasizes intra-
industry alliances, it is more likely to confront issues, generate solutions and structure procedural 
and communication channels that make salient and give priority to the objectives of intra-
industry exploitative learning (Ocasio, 1997). The focus of managerial attention centers on intra-
industry external learning activities in which the firm has more experience. Thus, the likelihood 
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of an initial acquisition in the converging industry decreases because managerial attention is 
focused on intra-industry exploitative learning creating a perceptual blindspot that it is too early 
or not necessary to initiate an acquisition. 
A shift in managerial attention to inter-industry alliance-based external learning occurs 
when there is a shift in experience.  While a shift in attention can be the result of adverse 
experience, the reduction of competing demands or a change in goal preferences (Cyert & 
March, 1963; Ocasio, 1997), our focus centers on a shift in experience related to initiating inter-
industry alliances. When a firm increases its relative focus on external learning in the inter-
industry environment, external learning in the intra-industry environment receives less attention. 
When a firm’s environment shifts in a novel and unfamiliar way that challenges bounded 
rationality, the most appropriate type of interdependence-reducing strategy is not obvious. In this 
case, firms tend to rely on prior experience (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). While a firm’s 
acquisition experience helps in next acquisition (Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999), its prior alliance 
experience also provides valuable information for future acquisitions (Lin et al., 2009; Wang & 
Zajac, 2007). Given the risks of a full absorption acquisition strategy, in a changing context such 
as IC, a plausible approach is for firms to first initiate alliances as an uncertainty-reducing 
strategy before initiating an acquisition.  
From an ex-ante perspective, firms do not know whether they will eventually convert 
alliance experience into an initial acquisition or whether there are substitutes such as competitive 
intelligence. However, alliance experience enhances a firm’s likelihood of an acquisition when 
they have access to or an understanding of strategic resources crucial to competing in the 
converging industry. When firms develop sufficient external learning that provides plausible 
evidence for the need and appropriateness of an acquisition, they will act (Lin et al., 2009; Zollo 
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& Reuer, 2010). As Weick, Sutcliffe and Obsfeld (2005) conclude in their review of the 
sensemaking perspective, managers do not need an accurate picture of an “interruption” (i.e., IC) 
but rather one that is sufficiently plausible to make them comfortable with acting. While it is 
possible that a firm will make an initial acquisition without inter-industry alliance experience, the 
likelihood is significantly reduced when it has not invested in external learning to access 
essential and timely information for plausible decision-making under high levels of uncertainty. 
Hypothesis 1: A firm’s inter/intra-industry alliance experience increases the likelihood of an 
initial acquisition in an adjacent converging industry. 
2.1.2 The Extent of IC 
How does the extent of IC affect the use of the alliance and acquisition resource 
dependence strategies? We first offer our approach for conceptualizing IC and then examine the 
direct and moderating effects of extent of IC on the inter/intra-industry alliance experience-
acquisition relationship. We adopt a cross-industry product-market diversification approach for 
theorizing the extent of IC. The extent of IC is an outcome of cross-industry product-market 
diversification undertaken by the collective set of firms striving to manage IC interdependences. 
Traditionally, IC has been conceptualized as a dynamic process consisting of three 
stages: separate, converging and converged (Stiegliz, 2003). In the separate stage, macro and 
micro drivers of IC are emerging and the industries operate relatively independently. In the 
converging stage, the boundaries of the industries begin to overlap. At some point, the 
converging industry’s boundaries become sufficiently blurred where the industries become de 
facto converged. Research indicates that the journey from the beginning of convergence 
(separate stage) to the point where convergence takes off (converging stage) typically requires 
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decades due to the complex interplay among multiple IC triggers (Schnaars, Thomas, and Irmak, 
2008) many of which are latent until circumstances are suitable for their manifestation. The 
converged stage is a period where industry change has settled down.  
While an ordinal conceptualization of IC is intuitively appealing, provides an organizing 
framework for the stages of IC and represents alternative system states (Dubin, 1978), its 
primary limitation is the absence of meaningful quantitative spacing between the values for the 
stages making comparisons of the relative extent of IC or the degree of difference within and 
across stages problematic.3 An alternative that we adopt is an industry-level, ratio-based 
conceptualization “extent of IC” defined as the degree of cross-industry product-market 
diversification for the set of competitors in two or more converging industries. A distinguishing 
characteristic of a ratio-based conceptualization is a non-arbitrary zero point. If the collective set 
of firms’ cross-industry product-market diversification is zero, conceptually the two industries 
are independent. When the ratio is one, it conceptually represents complete integration of the 
industries. In most cases the ratio would be expected to be significantly less than one because 
firms typically do not compete in all product-markets as a result of their strategies, resources, 
managerial preferences, institutional constraints or other micro-foundations of strategy.  
Theoretical justification for product-market diversification is also based in the resource 
dependence perspective. As Pffefer and Salancik (1978:109) note, in addition to alliances and 
acquisitions, diversification is an effective strategy to lessen dependence on present product-
markets. Diversifying into the converging industry product-markets reduces an organization’s 
vulnerability from relying on product-markets within their core industry. The collective action of 
firms’ cross-industry product-market diversification makes their respective industries more inter-
related. Our framing is consistent with Teece et al.’s (1994) product coherence concept. They 
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suggest that when firms display remarkable similarities in the product-markets in which they 
diversify, coherence occurs among these product-markets. Consequently, firms are coherent to 
the extent their products are related. The product coherence concept has been used in within-
industry contexts but not in a cross-industry converging context (Li & Greenwood, 2004). When 
there are a sufficient number of firms operating in a given pair of product-markets, inter-firm 
learning between the converging industries occurs. To put it differently, the density of firms 
concurrently operating across the two industries’ set of product-markets reflects the extent of IC.  
 
Figure 1 illustrates the extent of IC based on a cross-industry product market approach. 
 
Note: Assume that a given set (!!!,!!!,!!!  !"#  !!!) of product-market pairs across two industries has been 
impacted by supply substitution. The greater the number of firms competing simultaneously in the two 
industry product-market pairs, the more related the two industry products-markets become. Firms’ cross-
industry product-market diversification is an indication of the extent of IC as it reduces the distance between 
converging industries. 
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2.1.3 Direct Impact of Extent of IC 
Firms’ resource dependence strategies for managing interdependence collectively alter 
eco-system interconnectedness. In our case, firms are engaging in alliances, acquisitions and 
product-market diversification. According to Pffefer and Salancik (1978: 71), actions taken to 
manage interdependence (such as product-market diversification) may, in the long run, increase 
interdependence among environmental elements, requiring further action (such as acquisitions) 
to manage the new uncertainties. When the extent of IC is low, our position is that firms are 
more likely to initiate inter-industry alliances to reduce uncertainty since they provide more 
flexibility at a lower risk than acquisitions especially when the competitive landscape is in a state 
of flux. However, as the extent of IC increases learning from collective product-market 
diversification may sufficiently reduce uncertainty such that firms undertake acquisitions 
irrespective of their alliance experience. 
We hypothesize that inter-firm learning resulting from collective cross-industry product-
market diversification has a direct impact on firms’ acquisition activity in the converging 
industry. Collective cross-industry product-market diversification provides inter-firm learning 
and reduces uncertainties about IC as a result of competition between the two converging 
industries’ firms. As the two industries’ firms undertake product-market diversification they 
become competitors in terms of product-market commonality. Firms competing in the same 
product-markets are more likely to view each other as competitors (Chen, 1996). Prior IC 
research has demonstrated that convergence is likely to lead to increased competition (Greenstein 
& Khanna, 1997; Katz, 1996).    
When IC gives rise to competition among firms that were previously not competitors, 
competitive interdependence, a form of uncertainty becomes salient. In order to reduce 
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competitive interdependence – interdependence derived from the outcomes of competitive 
interrelationships among multiple organizations, firms initiate acquisitions to stabilize their 
environment (Mizruchi & Yoo, 2003; Hitt & Tyler, 1991). Initial acquisitions in a converging 
industry not only reduces competitive interdependence but also increases the power of the 
resulting larger organizations. Therefore, we expect that as the extent of IC increases the result is 
a higher likelihood of firms initiating their initial acquisition.  
Hypothesis 2: The likelihood of an initial acquisition in an adjacent converging industry 
will increase as the extent of industry convergence increases. 
2.1.4 Moderating Impact of Extent of IC 
When collective product-market diversification between converging industries increases 
inter-firm learning it reduces IC uncertainties in several forms. First, the resulting increase in 
cross-industry product-market density expands the set of referent others from which a firm can 
learn about the converging market (Srinivasan, Haunschild, & Grewal, 2007). Interaction 
experience with similar others is one of the best sources of learning, since it eases the difficulty 
of understanding and digesting new information (Ingram & Yue, 2011). For example, Srinivasan 
et al. (2007) found that in the converging digital camera market, the greater number of firms 
involved in the introduction of new digital camera products, the more others firms learned from 
firms’ new product decisions through mimetic and non-mimetic learning. Prior studies on 
benefits of competitive experience have confirmed this form of interfirm learning (Baum & 
Ingram, 1998).  
Second, the increasing density of cross-industry firms attracts investment from 
complementors and suppliers, leading to enhanced learning through multiple and divergent 
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sources. For example, the recent convergence between the personal computer and cell phone 
industry took off once the supporting infrastructure (e.g. various kinds of application software 
supporting Apple’s and Google’s Android systems) became well-developed. Incentives for 
application software developers to make investments in the Smartphone platform were enhanced 
when they observed more and more computer and information technology firms engaging in 
product-market diversification in the cell phone industry. Lastly, an increasing number of firms 
operating concurrently in the converging industries enhance the opportunity for exchange of 
personnel between firms (Li & Greenwood, 2004). This form of interfirm learning reduces 
uncertainties since employees carry knowledge across firms.     
The inter-firm learning mechanism triggered by firms’ cross-industry product-market 
diversification can substitute for uncertainty reduction provided by inter-industry alliance 
experience. When firms in a given industry learn about an adjacent converging industry through 
several sources (e.g., competitive experience in product markets, their suppliers, and employee 
mobility), the need for inter-industry alliance experience becomes less important. As we 
suggested above, the higher the extent of IC, the more integrated the converging industries 
become. Therefore, as these industries gradually blend into each other, intra- and inter-industry 
alliances are less distinguishable. Consequently, interfirm learning derived from the collective 
behavior of firms’ cross-industry product-market diversification serves as a substitution for 
individual firm learning from inter/intra industry alliance experience.  Hence, firms rely less on 
alliance experience for uncertainty reduction for making an initial acquisition.  
Hypothesis 3: The positive effect of a firm’s inter/intra industry alliance experience on the 
likelihood of an initial acquisition in an adjacent converging industry decreases as the 
extent of industry convergence increases. 
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2.2 RESEARCH METHO 
We selected the telecommunications equipment industry (the focal industry: SIC 3661, 
3663, and 3669) that has undergone convergence with the computer networking industry (the 
adjacent converging industry: SIC 3576) as our empirical context. Their blurred industry 
boundaries have been recognized as a salient case of convergence (Lee, 2007). In the 1980s, 
these industries belonged to the telecommunications and the computer sectors respectively. 
Firms in the telecom equipment industry (e.g. Nortel) relied on circuit switching technology as a 
core asset, while the core asset of firms (e.g. Cisco) in the computing networking industry was 
packet switching technology. Although circuit switching has the advantage of quality for voice 
calls, it is inefficient for data transmission. Thus, the new technology (packet switching) 
originating in computer networking was subsuming the old technology (circuit switching). In 
addition, core activities (the recurring actions that firms perform to attract/retain suppliers and 
buyers) in the telecom equipment were threatened. As the usage of the Internet grew in the 
1990s, telecom service firms (buyers) found that traditional circuit switching technology made 
network capacity insufficient and couldn’t fulfill the demand for data traffic, which forced 
telecom equipment firms to change their marketing and production activities. These firms also 
searched for new suppliers as the old product architecture became obsolete. This situation can be 
viewed as one form of IC that is triggered by supply side substitution forces. Many telecom 
equipment makers whose expertise was in circuit switching technology begun to beef up their 
packet switching capability by way of acquisitions in the computing networking industry. These 
deals provide an ideal context to examine a firm’s initial acquisition. 
COMPUSTAT was used to identify the two industry’s set of firms. The earliest packet-
switching communication equipment product was introduced in 1989, so our data collection 
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started from 1989. The year 2003 was selected as the end time point of our observation period 
because convergence slowed down in anticipation of deregulation and new technology – the 
industry started to migrate toward a new generation network structure (OECD, 2008).  
The number of telecom equipment firms during the study period was 147. The data 
source used to compile strategic alliances is Thompson Financial SDC. We identified alliances 
formed (1) between telecom equipment and computer networking industry (inter-industry 
alliances, n=52) and (2) within the telecom equipment industry (intra-industry alliances, n=166). 
The number of telecom equipment firms that had at least one alliance during the period 1989-
2003 is 63. In order to confirm the representativeness of these 63 equipment firms, we calculated 
their total sales revenue in 1999 as a percentage of the total sales revenues of the overall telecom 
equipment market estimated from Standard and Poor’s Industry Survey. Our sample contributes 
76% of the sales. Recognizing that SIC categories 3661/3663/3669 contain firms which do not 
have any alliances, we reviewed the remaining 82 firms that had no alliance activity (24% of 
sales). None of them are powerful firms (global top 10 players). The telecom equipment industry 
was historically dominated by a few giant firms significantly influenced industry evolution.  The 
inclusion of these firms in our analysis allows us to test whether and when firms with (or 
without) alliances are likely to acquire in the converging industry. We trace SDC’s alliances 
back to 1987 to ensure there is no left-censoring issue. The SDC database was used to retrieve 
acquisition deals that telecom equipment firms completed with computer networking firms. The 
total number of initial acquisition deals initiated during the 1989-2003 period is 25. These deals 
were verified using Lexis-Nexis. The total number of initial acquisitions initiated by firms in the 
computer networking industry was 4. The relatively small number of acquisitions by computer 
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networking firms is consistent with our conceptualization that the telecom equipment industry 
was being subsumed by the PC network technology. 	  
Consistent with our conceptualization of extent of IC based on product-market diversification, 
we compiled firm product-market portfolios using the CorpTech Directory database for our 
measures of the extent of IC (see below). The section “Who Makes What” identifies the profiles 
of all public firms operating in the telecom equipment and computer networking industries by 
product types. The Directory lists 65 product lines for the two industries and further categorizes 
these product lines into 17 product classes. In 1989, CorpTech assigned each product class based 
on whether it was a data-based or voice-based communication product. In the early years of IC 
(i.e. 1989), it is reasonable to assume that data-based communication products (37 product lines) 
belong to the computer networking industry and voice-based communication products (28 
product lines) fit into the telecom equipment industry 
2.2.1 Dependent variable 
The dependent variable, initial acquisition likelihood, is a dummy variable indicating 
whether a firm had an initial acquisition in the computer networking industry. For example, if a 
telecom equipment firm made an initial acquisition in the computer networking industry in 1996, 
the variable is coded as 0 from 1989 to 1995 and 1 in 1996. We only count initial acquisitions in 
which telecom equipment firms are acquirers and computer networking firms are targets. We 
include their acquisition activities that target both prior alliance partners and non-alliance 
partners. We made sure that equity-based alliances were not counted as initial acquisitions to 
avoid causality issues related including alliances as both an independent and dependent variable. 
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All of the independent and control variables are lagged one year, since we assume that alliance 
effects on the occurrence of an acquisition event are not immediate. 
2.2.2 Independent variable 
For the variable inter/intra-industry alliance experience, we measure the ratio of inter-
industry alliance experience to the sum of inter-and intra-industry alliance experience. Following 
previous work, we measure alliance experience by using the cumulative number of prior 
alliances (Anand & Khanna, 2000). Inter-industry alliance experience denotes the cumulative 
number of prior alliances that a telecom equipment firm had in the computer networking industry 
by counting all alliances formed from 1989 up to, but not including, the year when the focal firm 
made an initial acquisition. Intra-industry alliance experience is measured by the cumulative 
number of prior alliances that a telecom equipment firm had in its industry up to the initial 
acquisition year. Consistent with prior alliance experience literature (Lin et al., 2009; 
Rothaermel, 2001), our measure is a continuous proxy of external learning based on the 
emphasis a firm places on inter relative to intra-industry alliances. The measure is also consistent 
with our attention-diverting mechanism since the tendency to emphasize one type of alliance 
over the other influences managerial attention and resources directed towards the focal or 
converging industry.  
CorpTech was used to develop our measure extent of IC. The data for firms’ product-
market portfolios was assembled in a longitudinal firm-product matrix format by including firms 
(telecom equipment and computer networking) and their products (voice and data-based 
communication). We use the 15 yearly firm-product matrices from 1989 to 2003 to create our 
measure - extent of IC; the number of firms operating simultaneously in any pair of products 
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across the two industries (i.e. one voice product and one data communication product). We used 
a three-step process. First, using firms’ product portfolio information in the firm-product 
matrices, we create product-product matrices indicating the number of firms concurrently 
engaged in any pair of products. This dyadic approach is consistent with Li and Greenwood’s 
(2004) method. That is, the relatedness between a pair of markets can be measured via 
calculating the density of firms operating concurrently in the two markets. Second, in line with 
our conceptualization, to operationalize product coherence between the two industries, we 
retrieve information only from the cells in which there are firms competing simultaneously in 
pairs of voice- and data- products. For example, “network component” is one product line in the 
data category, and “telephone switching equipment” is a product line in the voice category. The 
number of firms simultaneously operating in the two product lines is an indicator of the degree to 
which the two products were becoming coherent. The greater number of firms operating in a pair 
of products is an indication of increasing coherence. For example, a value of 20 indicates that 
there are 20 firms operating in a given pair. If the number is zero, this means a given pair of 
products is incoherent (unrelated), since no firms from the two industries concurrently operate in 
the two products. CorpTech provides 37 data-based and 28 voice-based product lines. Thus, we 
generate 1036 (37 x 28) voice-and-data pairs. Third, we sum the cells for the set of voice and 
data-based products and then derive the final value of product coherence at year t by dividing the 
sum by the total number of all possible pairs (1036).  
To create the interaction variable the extent of IC measure is multiplied by the independent 
variable inter/intra-industry alliance experience. To avoid problems of multicollinearity, the 
interaction variables were centered by subtracting the sample mean from the individual values. 
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2.2.3 Control variable 
We control for several variables found to influence acquisition activity. Prior studies 
suggest that financial capability facilitates firm acquisitions and cash is the medium mostly used 
(Hitt, Ireland and Harrison 2001). A lack of free cash flow may limit a firm’s capability to 
acquire a converging industry firm. Therefore, we included the variable cash flow. The variable 
slack resource is controlled by measuring the ratio of total assets to debts (Lin et al., 2009).  
Organizational slack allows firms to have more discretion in response to environmental shifts 
and lower debt financing costs. 
Firms learn to make acquisitions from prior acquisition experience (Haleblian and 
Finkelstein,1999). Following Beckman and Haunschild’s (2002), we use a firm’s cumulative 
number of acquisition deals to measure prior acquisition experience. Since an initial inter-
industry acquisition is a risky action firms who had low prior performance may undertake risky 
strategic actions (Haunschild, 1993). We control for firm performance by measuring one-year-
lagged return on asset (ROA) a performance measure relevant to our industry (Dowling and 
McGee, 1994). Based on previous research, firm size (the natural logarithm of net sales), firm 
age, and firms’ number of alliances are controls (Lin et al., 2009). Firm size is expected to have 
a positive effect on acquisition likelihood, while firm age is expected to negatively affect 
acquisition likelihood. The variable firm’s numbers of alliances is measured by the number of 
alliances that a firm had in a given year and is expected to have a positive impact on acquisition 
likelihood, since this variable helps capture firms’ annual alliance formation tendency that is 
unrelated to the uncertainty reduction impact of alliance experience on acquisition likelihood. 
To reduce the concern of alternative explanations, we controlled for three additional variables 
specific to our context. The variable wireless focus is controlled by measuring whether the firm’s 
 28 
business focus was in the wireless equipment segment. The segment underwent growing market 
demand during the 1900s, which might reduce a firm’s incentive to make an initial acquisition. 
The variable is coded 1, if the firm’s SIC code is 3663 (radio- related equipment), otherwise 0. 
We control for an internal development effect using a Herfindahl concentration ratio for product 
scope; the breadth of 17 product classes in the voice- and data-based product-markets in which a 
firm has diversified. As part of their corporate strategy thrust, a firm may acquire a converging 
industry firm. The greater the product scope the more likely a firm will make an initial 
acquisition. Finally, we control for the variable R&D intensity (R&D expense/ net sales). 
Research has shown that R&D intensity is one factor influencing acquisition likelihood in the 
context of high-tech industries (Heeley, King, & Covin, 2006). We expect that high levels of 
R&D expense decrease the likelihood that a firm will make an acquisition in the converging 
industry. 
2.2.4 Analysis Model 
We estimate the likelihood of telecom equipment firms’ initial acquisition in the 
computer networking industry using event history analysis (i.e. hazard rate model). The 
likelihood of an initial acquisition is the probability that an acquisition will be observed at time t, 
given that no acquisition occurred prior to time t. This approach accommodates time-varying 
components and allows right-censored data. We employ a piecewise exponential model, a semi-
parametric models in which the baseline hazard rate is allowed to vary in each predefined time 
period. Other kinds of parametric models have more restrictive time dependence assumptions 
(Blossfeld & Rohwer, 1995). To estimate the hazard rates, we divided the data into yearly spells 
that are controls for year effects. Since we have firm-year observations, we use the “cluster” 
 29 
option in Stata, to calculate robust standard errors allowing for intra-firm correlation, relaxing 
the usual requirement that the observations be independent. 
2.3 RESULTS 
2.3.1 Descriptive Analysis 
Figure 2 presents the telecom equipment firms’ inter/intra-industry alliance experience, 
cumulative initial acquisitions for the computer networking companies and the pattern for extent 
of IC between 1990 and 2003. The data shows a steady increase in initial acquisitions and extent 
of IC and a slowing-down trend of extent of IC after 2000, which corresponds to the historical 
pattern of convergence noted earlier. On analyzing the temporal changes of firms’ inter/intra-
industry alliance experience, three interesting patterns emerge. First, we found an initial 
inter/intra-industry alliance spike and then decline in the 1990–1994 period. It is likely that firms 
were experimenting with inter-industry alliances during this period. Second, the figure shows a 
sharp rise during the 1994 to 1998 period. A time-lag correlation comparing alliance experience 
(1994-1998) with initial acquisition (1995-2000) was 0.9. The correlation is descriptive evidence 
that firms converted inter/intra-industry alliance experience into subsequent initial acquisitions. 
The third interesting finding is that while the industry alliance experience trend slowed after 
1998, the initial acquisition trend continued. This is consistent with our hypothesis that firms 
relied less on inter-industry alliance experience for making initial acquisitions as the extent of IC 
increased. 
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Figure 2. Telecommunication Equipment Firms’ Inter/Intra-Industry Alliance Experience, 
Initial Acquisition and Extent of IC 
 
Note: The values in the inter/intra-industry alliance experience chart are derived at the industry level via the 
equation: (telecom firms’ inter-industry alliance experience) / (telecom firms’ inter-industry alliance 
experience + intra-industry alliance experience) 
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2.3.2 Regression Analysis 
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics and correlations. All correlation coefficients are less than 
0.5 except for the one between firms’ alliance number and prior acquisition experience. The 
mean variance inflation factor (VIF) is 1.65 (min: 1; max: 3.68), which is well below the 
recommended criteria of 10. Table 2 presents the firms’ initial acquisition likelihood from the 
piece-wise exponential model. 
Model 1 is the baseline model including only control variables. The firm variables size, 
age, cash flows, acquisition experience, wireless focus, and alliance number are consistently 
significant across the models indicating that controlling for these variables provides a 
conservative test. Hypothesis 1 receives support in Model 2, 3, and 4 (β = 4.673, 3.678, and 6.1, 
p < 0.01, 0.05 and 0.001respectively). Thus, inter/intra-industry alliance experience is positively 
associative with initial inter-industry acquisition. The coefficients in Table 2 are not hazard rates. 
To derive hazard rates, one needs to calculate the exponential values of the coefficients. As an 
example, we use the coefficient of inter/intra-industry alliance experience (6.1) in Model 4. The 
inter/intra experience variable ranges from 0 to 1. Therefore a 0.1 unit increase results in an 
increase in the hazard rate (i.e. initial acquisition likelihood) by 182 % (e!.!" = 1.82). 
Hypothesis 2 states that the extent of IC has a positive impact on the likelihood of firms’ 
initial inter-industry acquisition. The coefficient for the extent of IC is positive and significant in 
both Models 3 and 4 (Model 3: β = 11.673, p<0.001; Model 4: β = 11.421, p<0.001) supporting 
Hypothesis 2. The coefficient (11.421) in Model 4 means that a 0.1 unit increase in the extent of 
IC results in an increase in the likelihood of an initial acquisition by 313% (e!.!"#! = 3.13),   
The interaction effect of inter/intra-industry alliance experience and extent of IC is 
negative and significant in Model 4 (β = -43.303, p<0.05) supporting hypothesis 3. When there is 
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a 0.1 unit increase in the extent of IC, a 0.1 unit increase of a firm’s emphasis on inter- over 
intra-industry alliance experience results in a decrease in the likelihood of an initial acquisition 
by 35% (0.1*0.1*-43.303 = -0.043 à e!!.!"# = 0.65). This suggests a substitution effect where 
as the extent of IC increases the positive effect of inter/intra-industry alliance experience on the 
likelihood of an initial acquisition weakens. We plotted the interaction in Figure 3 using one 
standard deviation above and below the mean to capture high and low extent of IC. Consistent 
with Figure 2, the low and high extent of IC occurred respectively in the two periods: 1989-1991 
(the average extent of IC = 0.2) and 2001-2003 (the average extent of IC = 0.4). This suggests 
that when the extent of IC is low, firm inter/intra-industry alliance experience increases the 
likelihood of a firm making its initial acquisition. However, as the extent of IC increases from 
0.2 to 0.4, the slope of the positive impact of a firm’s relative inter/intra-industry alliance 
experience on an initial acquisition decreases. The figure demonstrates that the extent of IC and 
relative inter/intra-industry alliance experience are substitutes for initiating an initial acquisition. 
The threshold point is where the two IC-extent lines cross (inter/intra-alliance experience = 
0.27). For low extent of IC, when a firm’s emphasis on inter- relative to intra-industry alliance 
experience is less than 0.27, it is less likely to make an initial acquisition than under a high extent 
of IC. The opposite occurs when inter-/intra-industry alliance experience is larger than 0.27. This 
implies that when the environment is characterized by high uncertainty (where the extent of IC is 
low) firms that exceed the threshold level (0.27 in our context) are more likely to initiate their 
initial acquisition. 
We assessed the robustness of our results. We considered the effect of the bursting dot-
com bubble in 2000. The formation of alliances dropped after the dot-com bubble which could 
inflate our results. We removed data after the year 2000 and reran our piecewise exponential 
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hazard models. The results were qualitatively the same as those in Table 2 in terms of sign and 
significance. We also reviewed the distribution of initial acquisitions during the period between 
1989 and 2003 and found no skewing of the data around the year 2000. Then, we tested if 
different types of alliances changed the results. Following Zollo and Reuer (2010) we 
decomposed our alliance data into joint ventures and non-equity alliances. Individually, neither 
joint venture nor non-equity alliance experience has a significant effect on initial acquisition, 
which is similar to Zollo and Reuer’s (2010) results. For a third robustness check we removed 
firms that did not have any alliances during our study period and found consistent results.  
Finally, we assessed the rival hypothesis that learning about partner-specific uncertainties is a 
primary driver of initial acquisitions. We reviewed whether our sample firms acquired any of 
their previous alliance partners (see Table 3). Of the 25 initial acquisitions, the number of 
acquisitions made by firms with at least one inter- or intra-industry alliance was 17. For the 17 
acquisitions, there was only one firm whose initial acquisition was with a partner in the computer 
networking industry. Thus, the rival hypothesis was not supported. We offer explanations for this 
intriguing finding in the discussion section. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics and Correlation (Essay One) 
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Table 2. Alliance Experience and Initial Acquisition Likelihood in an Adjacent Converging 
Industry 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Control variables     
Yearly effect Included Included Included Included 
     
Firm size -0.507*** -0.492*** -0.431*** -0.430*** 
 (0.091) (0.087) (0.095) (0.094) 
Firm age -0.058* -0.058** -0.044* -0.046* 
 (0.029) (0.022) (0.021) (0.020) 
Cash Flow 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Slack Resource -0.473 -0.284 0.205 0.189 
 (0.821) (0.641) (0.614) (0.618) 
Prior acquisition experience 0.476** 0.439*** 0.415*** 0.419*** 
 (0.145) (0.108) (0.091) (0.087) 
ROA 0.574+ 0.386 0.808* 0.835* 
 (0.310) (0.304) (0.353) (0.342) 
Wireless focus -1.512** -1.224** -1.341** -1.323** 
 (0.483) (0.451) (0.456) (0.449) 
Product scope 0.008 -0.283 -0.254 -0.171 
 (0.489) (0.506) (0.557) (0.560) 
R&D intensity -4.424* -4.719+ -4.122+ -3.897+ 
 (2.205) (2.468) (2.168) (2.003) 
Firm alliance number 0.349* 0.337** 0.296* 0.291* 
 (0.162) (0.130) (0.118) (0.114) 
     
H1:Inter/intra-industry alliance experience  4.673** 3.678* 6.100*** 
  (1.527) (1.502) (1.725) 
     
H2: Extent of IC   11.673*** 11.421*** 
   (1.798 (1.853) 
H3: Interactions     
Inter/Intra-industry alliance experience 
× Firm diversification balance    -43.303* 
    (21.003) 
     
Log-likelihood -68.626 -63.228 -53.160 -52.208 
Wald chi-square 15590.5 7834.37 10177.76 2554.09 
The analysis is based on 1231 firm-year observations covering 147 firms and 25 initial acquisition events. 
Estimated standard errors adjusted for clustering on subjects appear in parentheses. 
+p<0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 
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Figure 3. The Moderating Impact of Extent of IC on the Inter/Intra Alliance 
Experience - Acquisition Relationship 
 
 
Note: The graphic is based on the parameters estimated from Model 4 in Table 2 
2.4 DISCUSSION 
In eras of high uncertainty, such as during IC, RDT predicts that undertaking strategic 
initiatives is problematic.  Within this general problem domain, we examined one class of 
important yet underexplored decisions involving inter and intra-industry alliance experience and 
initial acquisitions during an era of IC characterized by increasing levels of collective cross-
industry product-market diversification. As a result of these strategic initiatives, we found that 
firms engage in multiple types of uncertainty-reducing strategies where their emphasis changed 
over time from intra-industry alliances to inter–industry alliances and then to acquisitions.5 
Using a RDT and learning perspective lens, our discussion focuses on three areas: extending the 
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boundary conditions of the alliance experience-acquisition relationship to a cross-industry 
context, the conceptual development and measurement of extent of IC and the managerial 
implications of early warning indicators in an era of IC.   
We extend resource dependence research by examining whether and how firms adapt to 
an era of IC through the inter-temporal use of alliances and acquisitions. First, research focusing 
on the alliance-acquisition relationship has not employed a RDT lens, except for Yin and 
Shanley’s (2008) conceptual work. Equally importantly, prior research using RDT has examined 
alliance and acquisition dependence-reducing strategies separately. As a result, each research 
stream seldom talks to one another. We begin to bridge this gap by focusing on the 
combinational use of these two important resource dependency actions. Accordingly, our study 
responds to the call by Hillman et al. (2009) for developing more studies exploring how firms 
use multiple uncertainty-reducing strategies.  
Second the alliance experience–acquisition relationship has important theoretical and 
practical implications because it sheds light on how the reduction of uncertainty impacts strategic 
decisions. We responded to calls by Lin et al. (2009) and Zollo and Reuer (2010) for developing 
a more complete understanding of when we should expect that alliance experience is linked to 
acquisition activity. Our premise is that research examining the role of alliance-related 
experience and its impact of subsequent acquisitions has focused on intra-industry contexts or on 
partner-specific learning irrespective of context (Porrini, 2004; Zaheer et al., 2010). Since IC is 
an increasingly common phenomenon, our finding of a significant inter-temporal alliance 
experience–acquisition relationship in a cross-industry context is a logical extension and 
introduces an important contingency. It is worthwhile to explore the degree to which our findings 
generalize to other IC contexts. 
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An intriguing finding from our post-hoc analysis was that only one firm acquired an alliance 
partner. We conjecture that while partner-specific uncertainty reduction (e.g. information 
asymmetry) is important and the focus of extant research (Reuer & Ragozzino, 2008; Zaheer et 
al., 2010), uncertainty reduction about the competitive landscape and assessing competitor 
competency-building and action-response profiles is important in eras of IC. We offer three 
plausible explanations for this conjecture. First, evolving competitive dynamics renders partner-
specific competencies less relevant. As a result, current partners may be less appropriate targets 
for an initial acquisition. Understanding the strategic significance of evolving competitive 
dynamics is one of the core activities of external learning. Second, developing knowledge of the 
acquisition-opportunity set is an important type of external learning. It is often assumed that 
valuable targets are scarce and thus competitors may initiate preemptive acquisitions. However, 
in our context, the market for acquisition targets did not dry up as the extent of IC increased. 
Instead, evidence suggests that it increased. Third, given the dynamic landscape, as targets assess 
their strategic position and undertake strategic initiatives they change the character of partner-
specific uncertainties.   
The conceptualization and operationalization of IC via the assessment of collective firms’ 
cross-industry product-market diversification contributes to IC literature in several ways. The IC 
literature has primarily focused on the antecedents of convergence, while devoting less attention 
to the process through which convergence unfolds (Burgelman & Grove, 2007). This is partly 
because valid and reliable empirical indicators of IC have not emerged. We began to address this 
limitation by developing an “extent” indicator which complements the stage view of IC. While 
not necessitating objective data, our quantitative approach produces a reliable, well-defined 
indicator that can be tracked over time. Although objective definitions of product-markets are 
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never perfect, when developed by knowledgeable stakeholders such as trade associations with 
input from managers they should be valid. Our extent of IC measure is both theoretically-based 
and managerially relevant. Future research can employ the measure to explore a variety of IC-
related questions such as IC velocity, pace, sequence, and their relationship to strategic action 
and firm outcomes. We also encourage the development of other IC indicators. 
Prior research has mostly assumed that there is only one product-market for each industry 
undergoing convergence (Greenstein & Khanna, 1997). Our conceptualization and 
operationalization relaxes the single product-market assumption. Through assessing the density 
of firms operating in “multiple” product-markets across industries, managers can better assess 
the degree to which industries overlap as well as the implications. In most cases industries 
converge asymmetrically across the two industry’s set of product-markets and the identification 
of the product markets most affected by IC provides value information for the design and 
implementation of strategic initiatives. Our measure of extent of IC is at the industry level. 
Examining inter-temporal relationships between firm-level product-market diversification, 
alliance and acquisition interrelationships is unexplored.  Yet these three uncertainty reducing 
actions represent the primary sources of firm growth.  Including all three simultaneously while 
challenging would likely provide nuanced explanations of their interrelationships, mechanisms 
and outcomes.  
An additional managerial implication relates to early warning systems (Grabo, 2004).  
Developing early warning indicators during IC provides managers with intelligence that 
minimizes surprise while providing sufficient time to initiate pre-emptive moves or fast 
responding countermoves. We identified three early warning indicators: inter/intra-industry 
alliance experience, initial acquisitions in the converging industry and the extent cross-industry 
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product-market convergence.  If a competitor emphasizes inter over intra-industry alliance 
experience, one may anticipate that it has a high likelihood of an initial acquisition in the 
adjacent industry. If the competitor is a market leader, its initial acquisition will significantly 
impact the competitive landscape by legitimizing cross-industry acquisitions, leading to imitation 
and other forms of legitimizing behavior thus accelerating IC.  When the extent of cross-industry 
product-market diversification reaches a threshold, IC is a foregone conclusion.    
Our results should be viewed in light of several limitations. We recognize that our 
uncertainty reduction and attention-based mechanisms provide explanations of the alliance 
experience - initial inter-industry acquisitions relationship in one type of IC context where one 
industry capability was being substituted by another capability. There are other types of IC such 
as when two industry capabilities complement each other. Thus, the generalizability to other IC 
contexts needs to be established. We think, however, that our logic is generalizable to other types 
of IC contexts and cross-industry strategic relationships, although the form and magnitude of 
relationships may change. Hence, we call for more studies on different types of IC. Studies that 
explore how other boundary conditions affect the cross-industry alliance experience – 
acquisitions relationship will provide valuable insights. For example, how do boundary 
conditions, such as firm size, emerging industry structures, globalization and evolving 
institutional norms impact the cross-industry alliance–acquisition relationship? Similarly, studies 
that explore external learning for other cross-industry topics, such as executive relocation, 
knowledge transfer, and multi-market competition would improve our understanding of the 
generalizability and boundary conditions for the uncertainty reducing and attention mechanisms. 
Research that explores the alliance - acquisition relationship in other types of IC would allow 
comparative assessments across contexts. 
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While 25 cross-industry acquisitions representing a small number on which to base our 
conclusions, there are at least three reasons why this number is to be expected and meaningful in 
an IC context. First, intra-industry acquisitions were also initiated during our study period. 
Second, from a managerial perspective, one would not expect a significantly higher number of 
cross-industry acquisitions for a variety of plausible reasons including the desire of potential 
acquiring firms to remain independent and “go on their own”, a perception that there are a 
limited number of “attractive” targets in the adjacent industry, targets that prefer to remain 
independent, antitrust considerations and available targets that are perceived not to “fit” with a 
potential acquirer. Finally, our uncertainty reducing and attention-diverting mechanisms can 
operate in opposing directions: simultaneously increasing and decreasing the likelihood of an 
initial acquisition.  Thus, their overall effect will vary across firms. Given that the number of 
acquisitions is likely to be small in IC contexts, detailed qualitative research could explore the 
processes of external learning and other strategic topics for a subset or the population of 
acquisitions. 
We did not measure external learning, uncertainty reduction or attention directly (Ancona 
& Caldwell, 1992; Bresman, 2010). Empirical indicators for these mechanisms would permit the 
development of mediated models and the opportunity to develop multilevel models examining 
how forms and attributes of external learning are structured by micro-level actions. In addition to 
interviewing and survey-based methods, one approach for operationalizing external learning is 
the content analysis of firm and industry documents identifying evidence that firms are engaging 
in uncertainty reduction or directing attention to issues in the adjacent industry, potential targets 
and industry convergence. 
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3.0  ESSAY TWO: DEPTH OF FIELD AND FIRM PERFORMANCE 
When the boundaries between industries become blurred, ambiguity arises in the sense 
that identifying, distinguishing and assessing competitors actions and intentions problematic. 
This unique nature of IC leads me to ask: where and how should firms direct their attention 
toward a fuzzy competitive environment. Drawing on the attention-based view (Ocasio, 1997), 
this paper attempts to examine the performance effect of firm attention on multiple competitors 
during industry convergence. Specifically, I adopt Ocasio’s (1997:190) “situated attention” 
perspective and view firms’ competition with multiple competitors as a situation that shapes their 
attention on the changing landscape. 
This inquiry is theoretically important for two key reasons. First, despite recent interest in 
IC (Greenstein & Khanna, 1997; Burgelman & Grove, 2007), the literature has been limited in 
one important aspect. Researchers investigating this phenomenon have almost exclusively 
focused on market-level structural dynamics (Katz, 1996; Wirtz, 2001), ignoring how firms 
achieve competitive advantage during IC. Although a few studies have begun to explore the 
strategic implications of firm-level actions, including new product introduction (Srinivasan et al., 
2007) and diversification (Burgelman & Grove, 2007), this set of research did not examine 
performance linkages. The paucity of such studies severely limits our understanding of the 
strategies needed for success in an era of IC. 
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Second, IC provides a good setting to revisit the attention-based view theory. The central 
tenet of this theory is that firms cannot attend to all issues due to limited capacity and thus 
sequential attention on a specific issue prevents distraction by irrelevant ones (Cyert & March, 
1963; Greve, 2008). This important assumption directs literature to focus on firm attention 
toward specific issues (e.g. Durand, 2003; Eggers & Kaplan, 2009; Vissa, Greve, & Chen, 2008). 
However, less effort has been made to examine what if and when firms need to simultaneously 
attend to multiple issues. Sullivan’s (2009) and Rerup’s (2008) work are exceptional examples 
that shed insights on the intraorganizational arena. My study focuses on the interorganizational 
competition area. Arguably, attending to a single competitor can be viewed as a specific issue to 
firms, while attending to a large set of competitors would be seen as involving with multiple and 
complicated issues (Chen, 1996; Miller, 1993). Attending to multiple competitors is crucial 
during IC, firms need to identify a new set of competitors from the adjacent converging industry 
as well as recognize which intra-industry competitors are taking action to seize market 
opportunities in the adjacent industry. This paper intends not only to tackle this inattention 
problem but also to examine conditions under which firms need to balance their attention toward 
a few vs. multiple competitors. 
Where should firm direct its attention during IC? This paper developed a construct – 
Depth of Field (DOF). In photography, DOF is the range from the near to the far objects that 
appears to be in focus in an image. When the objects in the foreground are emphasized but those 
in the background are deemphasized, the DOF is in a shallow focus. If one prefers a clear 
landscape picture, she needs to adjust focus by letting objects in both the foreground and 
background appear sharply clear, which is known as deep focus (Sanchez-Burks & Huy, 2009). 
Ocasio (1997) suggests that decision-makers’ attention focus depends on “the particular context 
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or situation they find themselves in”. Adopting this situated attention perspective, this study 
defines DOF as the number and variety of competitors with which a firm competes. Situated 
attention is based on an objective consideration suggesting that firms attend to one another 
through interacting and engaging in market competition (Baum & Korn, 1996; Jayachandran, 
Gimeno, & Varadarajan, 1999; Tsai, Su, & Chen, 2011). Market competition serves as a 
competitive situation which stimulates and shapes a firm’s attention to its landscape change. The 
greater number and variety of a firm’s competitors, the deeper a firm’s DOF. The core argument 
of this paper is that a deep DOF stimulates a broad attention to what is going on in a changing 
landscape and thus assists the firm in reducing competitive ambiguity. 
I further propose that several challenges will occur when a firm deepens DOF. 
Specifically, I investigate three conditions (i.e. locus of convergence, competitors’ DOF, and 
firm age) that impede or promote the extent to which firms derive benefits from a deep DOF. 
These conditions represent challenges from different levels respectively (the environment, 
competitor, and organizational level). To test these hypotheses, I use the context of voice-data 
convergence between the telecom equipment and PC networking industries from 1991-2003. I 
found that the positive performance effect of a deep DOF weakens when (1) IC occurs in most of 
a firm’s product markets, (2) a firm’s competitors’ DOFs are shallow and (3) the firm is 
relatively old. 
The study contributes to the literature in two ways. First, by introducing the DOF 
construct, this paper enriches the connection between the attention-based view and industry 
evolution literature. A deep focus is particularly important in a blurring environment change 
context where industry and firm boundaries are in a state of flux, because it helps firms to 
overcome inattention through engaging competition with multiple/different competitors. Second, 
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this research extends firm attention theory through the development of a contingency model 
showing how a firm can optimize its attention across multiple issues (i.e. deep focus) as opposed 
to focusing on specific ones (i.e. shallow focus). My empirical analysis demonstrates the relative 
impact of contingencies on the DOF-performance relationship. First paragraph. The figure below 
is inserted so that there is an item in the sample List of Figures. 
3.1 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
I ground the DOF construct in organizational attention literature. The attention of a firm 
can be understood as the noticing, encoding, interpreting, and focusing of time and effort by the 
firm on both issues and answers (Ocasio, 1997: 189). A wide range of disciplinary studies has 
centered on organizational attention (Hansen & Hass, 2001; Pollock, Rindova, & Maggitti, 2008; 
Tuggle et al., 2010). Researchers have used two approaches including (1) situated attention: 
contexts where firms are situated and exposed (e.g. Durand, 2003; Sullivan, 2010; Vissa et al., 
2010) and (2) cognitive attention: managers’ mental template (e.g. Reger & Huff, 1993; Cho & 
Hambrick, 2006; Nadkarni & Barr, 2008). Controlling the second approach, this paper focuses 
on the former. As for the context, given that IC is a complex phenomenon and the literature is 
still emerging I focus on a supply substitution type of IC (see Appendix A for the details of IC 
taxonomy). 
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3.1.1 How Contexts Shape Awareness - Situated Attention 
In the attention-based view literature, the characteristics of situation determine how 
organization takes time and effort to scan, notice, encode and interpret issues (Ocassio, 1997; 
Cyert & March, 1963). This view is rooted in social psychology. A succinct description about 
this view can be found in Cialdini, Reno and Kallgreen’s (1990) work: whether individuals litter 
or not in public parks depends on the intensity of their exposure to different written signs, other 
individuals’ littering, and how frequent parks constantly clean littering.  
The situated attention perspective has been applied in several areas of the management 
field. In the behavioral theory of firm, situation refers to reference points that an organization 
uses to determine its aspiration level. Reference points may come from its own historical 
performance or other organizations’ performance. When organizations found actual performance 
below (above) their aspiration level, they will shift attention toward risky (risk-averse) actions 
(Iyer & Miller, 2008; Greve, 2008; Vissa et al., 2010). In social network theory, situation can be 
viewed as the structural elements of contexts that an organization interacts with. For example, a 
good network position (e.g. centrality or structural hole) helps a firm be aware of events in many 
markets and alert to the problems competitors are focused on (Freeman, 1979; Burt, 1992: 116).  
In competitive dynamics research, resource similarity and market commonality between a focal 
firm and a given rival will draw the focal firm’s attention and thus enhance its competitive 
awareness on that rival (Chen, 1996). This research focuses on attention toward a set of 
competitors, instead of only one. During IC, situated attention is similar to a discovery-driven 
view of knowledge acquisition, such as ‘knowing as doing’ (Spender, 1996) and ‘seeing as the 
consequence of experience’ (McGrath & MacMillan, 1995; Rentsch, Heffner, & Duffy, 1994), 
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which serves as an effective way of drawing managerial attention and thereby enhances their 
understanding of the competitive environment. 
3.1.2 Depth of Field 
The DOF concept is still in the infant stage in industry evolution studies, but has gained 
attention in the areas of organizational and consumer behavior. In organizational behavior, DOF 
is used in leadership research and described as the ability to recognize the composition of diverse 
emotions within an organization (Sanchez-Burks & Huy, 2009). Although fear is prevalent 
among a majority of employees during strategic change, a minority of them may have “hope” for 
change. So, change leaders’ success is contingence on their ability to adjust their DOF from a 
setting that brings into a single group’s emotion to a setting in which one can capture diverse 
patterns of shared emotions in a collective. In marketing, researchers apply DOF to help 
marketing managers design visual presentation tools that provide more context than detail or 
present various alternatives within a given visual field to consumers (Lurie & Mason, 2007).  
Lurie and Mason (2007) claim that visual presentation that provide greater details (a shallow 
focus) may lead to overconfidence since users make assessment based on fewer observations, 
whereas visualizations that provide greater context (a deep focus) lower decision makers’ costs 
of adding alternatives to a consideration set for users. Therefore, DOF affects how decision 
makers access, evaluate and ultimately use information. A shallow focus leads to a better 
understanding of the details of a particular object (e.g. product). A deep focus is good for faster 
navigation around the whole picture as well as avoiding the problem of overconfidence where 
decision makers tend to eliminate alternatives from consideration.  
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This suggest that the conceptual use of DOF is intuitively compelling and promising for 
industry evolution research (including IC) because it addresses how firms confronted with a 
changing environment can develop the understanding of other organizations competing in the 
environment. This study intends to contribute the use of DOF in the competition arena and define 
it as the number and variety of competitors with which a firm competes. Firms pay attention to 
competitors through interacting and engaging in market competition with them (Tsai et al., 2011; 
Jayachandran et al., 1999). When industry boundaries blurred, the competitive environment that 
firms construct is an incomplete reality (White, 1981). The number of competitors assists in 
enriching a firm’s competitive knowledge structure (McNamara, Luce, & Tompson, 2002). The 
more competitors with which a firm engages market competition, the more broadly the firm 
attends to its competitive environment. By the notion of the “variety” of competitors, I refer to 
the degree to which a firm has competitors that are different from it in terms of product market 
commonality. I concentrate firms’ situation on product market competition which directs and 
shapes their attention, since product market is the fundamental unit of analysis of industry 
change (Klepper & Thompson, 2006). Competition is the function of market commonality: the 
greater the market commonality between two firms, the more similar they are, the more they 
view each other as close competitors (Chen, 1996; McPherson, 1983; Peteraf & Bergen, 2003). 
Competing with rivals that have different market profiles than the firm widens its competitive 
knowledge (Miller & Chen, 1996). Consequently, the variety of competitors expands the area of 
a firm’s attention on its competitive landscape. Figure 4 illustrates how a deep vs. shallow DOF 
creates a different understanding of a landscape. Assume that there are four firms which have 
different DOF respectively. Firm A has the shallowest DOF, since it derives the landscape 
picture mainly from a few close competitors. On the other hand, firm D owns the deepest DOF in 
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that it is exposed to many distant competitors thus expanding the area of its DOF. Note that firm 
D has a deeper DOF than firm C because of the number of competitors. Taken together, a focal 
firm’s DOF is comprised of the number of its competitors as well as the dissimilarity between 
itself and its competitors. 
Figure 4. A Conceptual Map of Firm’s DOF 
 
 
3.2 HYPOTHESES 
How does a deep DOF influence firm performance during IC? As noted earlier, the goal 
of this paper is to develop a DOF-performance contingency framework. Figure 5 summarizes the 
direct effect of DOF as well as three contingencies. While a deep DOF has a positive impact on 
 50 
performance, the contingencies at the industry, competitor and firm levels arise from the result of 
extending a firm’s DOF from a shallow to deep focus. At the industry level creating a deep focus 
is costly in that it requires firms to broaden their product markets and may result in attention 
overcapacities (Rerup, 2009). The justification of attention allocated to a deep DOF needs to be 
based on whether firms’ product markets are inside a locus of convergence (i.e. the product 
markets where IC occurs across industry boundaries). Thus, the locus of convergence (see 
concept explanation below) is used as the first contingency. Second, at the competitor level firms 
have to overcome attention overload problems based on the extent to which they can filter 
important signals from irrelevant noise through analyzing their competitors. Thus I examine how 
one’s competitors’ DOF moderates the DOF-performance relationship. Third, at the firm level, 
transforming the understanding of the diverse competitive landscape into strategic actions 
requires internal changes which conflict with organization inertia (e.g. Hannan & Freeman, 
1984). Since the rigidity occurs with senescence, this paper examines firm age as a moderator. 
 
Figure 5. A Contingency Model of DOF and Firm Performance during IC 
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3.2.1  Baseline 
I claim that two mechanisms operate the relationship between a deep DOF and 
performance. The first mechanism is clarity. A deep focus is developed through competing with 
multiple different competitors. Having many or different competitors alone would not create a 
clear landscape picture. Although there is a benefit of diversity, firms may still find confusing 
and difficult to interpret the information they gain. For example, the fact that one firm competes 
with a few of different competitors is very likely to create a perplexing, rather than clear, picture 
due to insufficient numbers. A statistical analogy would be useful for better understanding why 
this is the case. In statistics, to have a wider range of confidence level, ones need to have both of 
large sample size and standard deviation. The number of competitors is the sample size, while 
the heterogeneity of competitors is standard deviation (Fiegenbaum & Thomas, 1995; Rhee, 
Kim, & Han, 2006).  
In addition to the clarity argument, a deep focus through competing with multiple 
different competitors creates another mechanism for firm: alertness. Alertness is a process in 
which a firm maintains a constant state of cautiousness with respect to its competitors. In the 
literature, alertness has been described as not only vigilance for potential threats (Janis, 1972) but 
also the ability to discover entrepreneurial opportunities (Kirzner, 1973, 1992). Alertness is 
manifested in a situation where individuals position themselves in the flow of information such 
that the probability of encountering opportunities without a deliberate search is maximized 
(Kaish & Gilad, 1991). A deep DOF escalates a firm’s state of vigilance by putting firms in this 
position of competitive information flow.   
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After IC is initiated, firms are confronted with difficulties in identifying potential 
competitors when protecting their core markets or recognizing opportunities in entering new 
markets. Avoiding competitive blindspots therefore is the key performance driver during IC 
(Khanna & Greenstein, 1997). The problem of competitive blindspots has been linked to 
overconfidence problems stemming from the biases due to unclear understanding and 
carelessness (Ng et al., 2009; Russo & Schoemaker, 1992; Zahra & Chaples, 1993; Zajac & 
Bazerman, 1991). Therefore, a deep focus creates the mechanisms of clarity and alertness which 
reduce the problems of competitive blindspots, thereby enhancing firm performance during IC.  
H1: During industry convergence, a high level of DOF is positively related to firm 
performance.  
 
3.2.2 DOF Challenge: Cost Justification for Attention Allocated 
Creating a deep DOF is costly. Although competing with many and distant competitor 
provides opportunities allowing firms to be aware of the variability and commonality of 
competitors during IC, firms will have to devote enormous attentions as well as to carry excess 
capacity, if they aim to derive a comprehensive clear picture of the landscape. The context of IC 
makes deepening DOF more difficultly since the landscape is changing. Day and Schoemaker 
(2004) liken the attempt to fully scan one’s competitive landscape to military reconnaissance 
missions. If the war situation is constantly changing, one will need to fly reconnaissance 
missions over and over, which is very costly. Costs of developing a deep DOF include product 
market entries, coordination across business units, defending against competitors’ attacks, and 
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overhead for constantly scanning the environment. Consequently, cost justification is a challenge 
for firms when develop a deep DOF during IC. 
To investigate how IC impacts the performance effect of a deep focus, I use the degree of 
firms’ cross-industry product market diversification as a base for capturing the extent to which 
industries converge in Figure 1. Specifically, through assessing the density of firms operating in 
“multiple” product markets across industries, one can create a map indicating what I terms locus 
of convergence (i.e. the product markets where IC is occurring across industry boundaries). In 
other words, the product market is an appropriate unit of analysis for studying IC and locus of 
convergence identifies the product markets most affected by IC. The strategic implications of 
firm cross-industry product market diversification is that it blurs industry boundaries via 
reducing the distance of cross industry product markets, reduces entry barriers for neighboring 
industry firms and thus makes competitor identification and assessment more difficultly.  
I contend that if locus of convergence is in the product markets where firms are 
operating, firms should shrink their area of DOF into a shallow focus. This argument 
corresponds to the predictions of state uncertainty (i.e. an inability to assign probability as to the 
likelihood of future events) and effect uncertainty (i.e. an inability to predict the effect of any 
given environmental stage on one’s organization) in the environment literature (Milliken, 1987; 
Miller & Shamsie, 1999).1 Milliken (1987: 137) notes that “knowing, for example, that a 
hurricane is headed in the general direction of your house does not mean you know how it will 
affect your particular house (e.g. will your house be left standing?)”. Arguably, firms that operate 
in product markets impacted by IC, to a more or less extent, are aware that they are under the era 
                                                
1 Milliken’s third type of uncertainty (response uncertainty) may also be a mechanism explaining how convergence 
affects firm performance. Future research could focus on this interest area – for example, firms’ decision speed of 
responses as analogous to shut speed of taking a picture.   
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of convergence. What managers cannot predict is that how convergence will impact their own 
organizations. In this case, it is safer to stick with a narrower scope of product markets where 
managers have better controls (Miller & Shamsie, 1999). When a hurricane is entering the zone 
where you are living, you should focus on finding a safe location to ride out the storm. Similarly, 
when IC impacts a given product market, it creates hefty entry threats to firms operating there. 
Firms should focus on competitors that are similar to them. Therefore, it is better to narrow one’s 
DOF. In contrast, if a firm is operating in product markets outside locus of convergence, it 
should develop a deep DOF. If you, for example, live in a zone nearby a hurricane, you will 
desire to know the future trajectory of the hurricane by collecting as much information as you 
can. The uncertainty for firms operating outside locus of convergence is whether and when IC 
will impact their product markets. Managers in this kind of firms are confronted with state 
uncertainty. Accordingly, they should deepen DOF.  
H2: During industry convergence, a firm’s product market emphasis within the locus of 
convergence (product markets where the convergence is occurring) will negatively 
moderate the DOF - performance relationship. 
3.2.3 DOF Challenge: Attention Overload 
In addition to attention allocated in various competitors, another challenge is attention 
overload. This challenge is subtly different than the one in the previous section because the 
attention overload issue is the challenge for what you actually derive from a deep DOF, whereas 
the cost justification issue is the challenge for what you need to pay to gain a deep DOF. As a 
firm deepens its DOF, information received by managers disproportionally increases. To a large 
extent, a deep DOF requires attention that may approach or exceed the firm’s information 
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processing capabilities. Day and Schoemaker (2004: 132) note that attention overload increases 
the likelihood of confusion to managers; thus “to see everything is seeing nothing”. Supporting 
this view, research recognizes that managers tend to simplify their knowledge structure by 
focusing on relevant information while ignore irrelevant issues (Daft & Weick, 1984; Porac & 
Thomas, 1994; Reger & Huff, 1993). The advantage is that the filter assists managers in 
attending to a small set of information. Nevertheless, it does not guarantee the quality of the 
filtered information. 
This suggests that the resolution of attention overload challenge of a deep DOF rests on 
to what extent firms can filter important signals from irrelevant noises when deriving a picture of 
the changing landscape. One of fundamental task in competitive intelligence is to reduce the 
noise-to-signal ratio: targeting the signals that are critical to organizations and decreasing the 
volume of noise (Prescott & Miller, 2003). Imagine that a deep DOF may create dozens of or 
nearly one hundred dots in a firm’s radar screen. When most of competitors a firm engages with 
have a shallow focus, their competitive moves filtered into this firm’s radar will turn out to be 
useless or obsolete information. On the contrary, when a firm is situated with a large set of 
competitors who have a deep focus, it can take advantage by leveraging competitors’ 
information-processing capability through exposure to meaningful signals (Homburg, 
Grozdanovic, & Klarmann, 2007; Ingram & Baum, 1997). Combining a firm own DOF and its 
competitors’ DOF leads to a better judgment in reducing the noise-to-signal ratio, thus reducing 
the attention overload challenge. 
H3: During industry convergence, competitors' DOF will positively moderate the DOF - 
performance relationship. 
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3.2.4 DOF Challenge: Inertia Prohibiting Actions 
To convert the benefit of a deep DOF into performance, firms need to take actions based 
on inputs from a variety of competitors. IC is fraught with disruptive opportunities and threats, 
such actions typically require strategic initiatives deviating from what firms are currently doing, 
which very likely conflicts with firms’ reliability and accountability: the source of structural 
inertia (Hanna & Freeman, 1984). One key factor compounding inertia is firm age. While older 
organizations would have developed mature infrastructures for processing external information 
than younger ones, they may not fit an IC context where formerly separate industries are brought 
together, which changes the basis of competition (Greenstein & Khanna, 1997). Older firms 
establish bureaucratic routines that create inertia (Hannan & Freeman, 1984). They are subject to 
the liability of obsolescence because they become unresponsive to changes in the external 
environment (Barron, West, & Hannan, 1994; Ranger-Moor, 1997). The aging process increases 
a firm’s tendency to build on and refine its previous technological activities (Sorensen & Stuart, 
2000: 88). As a firm ages, its internal clockspeed will become a burden if external clockspeed is 
accelerating. The inertia prevents firms from taking action even when they become aware that 
some competitors are experimenting in new products or services. I predict that when developing 
a deep DOF, older firms will encounter more inertia challenges than younger firms. Research has 
shown that it is because mature firms could not make connections between organizational 
resources/systems and sustainable product success (Dougherty & Hardy, 1996). This makes 
difficult or slow down strategic initiative even when old firms have a deep focus. Young firms 
who have a deep focus, by contrast, suffer less from the problems of inertia and therefore have 
more advantages of leveraging benefits from a deep focus. They have more incentives to take 
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actions, since managers in young firms recognize that they have fewer burdens regarding 
bureaucracy and am willing to modify their competitive positions. 
H4: During industry convergence, age of the firm will negatively moderate the DOF -
performance relationship. 
3.3 RESEARCH METHOD 
3.3.1 Empirical Context 
The convergence between the telecommunications equipment (SIC: 3661, 3663, and 
3669) and computer networking (SIC: 3576) industries serves as my empirical context for 
several reasons. First, convergent technology and the growth of the Internet eroded boundaries 
between the two industries enabling competition between the two industry’s firms beginning in 
the 1990s which trigged IC. In the 1980s, these industries belonged to the telecommunications 
and the computer sectors respectively. Firms in the telecommunications equipment industry (e.g. 
Nortel and Alcatel) relied on circuit switching technology as a core asset, while the core of firms 
(e.g. Cisco and 3Com) in the computing networking industry is packet switching technology. 
Circuit switching was designed for voice traffic of telecommunications network service. When 
someone dials a voice call, the network saves a network path for the entire duration of the call 
but cannot share it with others. In contrast, the packet switching is designed for data traffic of 
Internet Protocol (IP) in which data are broken into small segments called packets. IP does not 
need to save a path for the entire duration of the call. Because of supply-side and demand-side 
drivers, the industries of voice communication and data communication began to converge in the 
1990s. Services that were traditionally provided by circuit switching technology then were 
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subsumed by networks that used packet switching technology. Packet switching technology 
foster the development of new services/products, such as the integration of voice mail and email, 
teleconferencing, white boarding, and networking switches (Lee, 2007). Second, as the usage of 
the Internet grew in the 1990s, telecommunications service firms (buyers) found that traditional 
circuit switching technology made network capacity insufficient and couldn’t fulfill the demand 
for data traffic, which forced telecom equipment firms to change their marketing and production 
activities. Moreover, these firms had to search for new suppliers because the old product 
architecture becomes obsolete. These force together speed up the integration of voice and data 
communication (e.g. ADSL and Internet telephony equipment). The above two reasons indicated 
that convergence between the two industries had been initiated in the early 1990s (See Appendix 
B for details of industry context). Finally, during the convergence, some firms were disrupted 
(underperformed and failed), while others performed well. The heterogeneity of firm 
performance provides variation in dependent variable. 
3.3.2 Data 
COMPUSTAT was used to identify firms in the telecommunications equipment industry 
(SIC: 3661, 3663, and 3669) and the computer networking industry (SIC: 3576). Using 
CorpTech Directory, I compiled firm product portfolio for these two industries. In the directory, 
the section “Who Makes What” describes the profiles of all firms involved in technology-
intensive industries by product types. This study selected public firms. The reliability of the 
database has been confirmed in prior literature (Lee, 2007). The packet-switching equipment 
product was commercialized in the early 1990s, so the data collection started in 1991. I then 
trace these firms’ product portfolios for 13 years until the end of 2003. In 2003, the convergence 
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slowed down in anticipation of deregulation and new technology—the industry started to migrate 
toward a new generation network structure (OECD, 2008: 15). 
The CorpTech Directory provides 65 product lines for the above two industries. I use 
these product lines as the bases of firms’ DOF. CorpTech further classifies these product lines 
into 17 product classes (see Table 3). They also categorize each product class by whether its 
fundamental technology is a data-based or voice-based communications product. Although 
distinction of data- or voice-based products becomes difficult as IC progressed, in the early 
converging stage (i.e. year 1989) it is safe to argue that data-based communications products (37 
product lines) belong to the computer networking industry and voice-based communications 
products (28 product lines) fit into the telecom equipment industry. To ensure that all of firms 
from COMPUSTAT actually belong to the two industries, I screen out those firms that do not 
have product lines in either the telecommunications equipment or computer network industries. 
This procedure reduced the total sample size to 1436 firm-year observation covering 225 firms 
(telecom equipment: 143; computer networking: 82). The data is assembled in a longitudinal 
firm-product matrix format including firms (telecom equipment vs. computer networking) and 
their products (voice- vs. data-based). The number of firms in the data panel is unbalanced across 
years, because some firms discontinued operations, whereas others entered into the panel. 
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Table 3. Product Classes of the Telecommunications Equipment and Computer 
Networking Industry 
 
CORPTECH’S 
CODE  
VOICE- OR 
DATA-
BASED 
PRODUCT CLASS EXAMPLE 
TEL-BR VOICE Broadcasting/Receiving 
Equipment 
Mobile radio system 
TEL-CI DATA Communication Interfaces RS-232 interface 
TEL-CS DATA Communication Security 
Devices 
Encryption devices 
TEL-DC DATA Data Concentration Equipment Data terminal 
TEL-EM DATA Electronic Mail Equipment Facsimile equipment 
TEL-MX DATA Multiplexers/Modems Modem 
TEL-NW DATA Communication Networks 
Equipment 
LAN (Local Area Networks) equipment 
TEL-SI DATA Signal-Related Equipment Signal propagation device 
TEL-SM VOICE Satellite/Microwave 
Communication Equipment 
Satellite reception/transmission equipment 
TEL-TD DATA Telecom Distribution 
Equipment 
T-1 equipment 
TEL-TE VOICE Telephone/Voice Equipment PBX (Private Branch Exchange) 
equipment 
TEL-TR VOICE Transmission Systems 
Equipment 
Transmission antenna 
TEL-ZD DATA Other Data Communication 
Equipment 
Teleconferencing systems 
TMA-SS VOICE Security/Safety Equipment Alarms/Intrusion detection 
PHO-FO DATA Fiber Optic Equipment Fiber-optic receivers/demutiplexer 
SOF-CS DATA Communication Software LAN software 
SUB-ES VOICE Electronic Subsystem Amplifiers 
3.3.3 Dependent variable 
The dependent variable, firm performance, is firm one-year-lagged sales divided by one-year-
lagged total employees (sales productivity). I chose this operationalization for several reasons. 
First, my theory is conceptualized within the competition research domain. Competitive strategy 
studies have used sales-related variables as their performance measurement (e.g. Ferrier, 2001). 
The denominator of this variable captures the extent to which a firm gains or loses market sales 
from their rivals. Second, since my context involves two industries, using traditional 
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performance metrics, such as ROS or ROA, is not appropriate. The profit margin structure 
differs across the telecommunications equipment and computer network industries. Third, I did 
not select Tobin’s Q, because in the later 1990s, the stock price of many firms in these industries 
were overvalued and exaggerated (Sterling, Bernt, & Weiss, 2006). 
3.3.4 Explanatory variable – DOF and moderators  
DOF is based the situation attention perspective which suggest competition contexts that 
firms are exposed to stimulate and shape their attention. However, cognitive research suggests 
managerial cognition is inter-related with situated attention (Ocasio, 1997). Therefore, it is 
important to empirically understand whether cognitive attention (perception-based: the intensity 
and breadth of firm perception about the competitive environment) affects the situated attention 
predictions (exposure-based) or vice versa. I control for the perceptual DOF in my model (see 
below).  
For Objective DOF, I follow Boyd, Gove, & Hitt’s (2005: 245) approach of construct 
measurement by incorporating measures of two dimensions (i.e. number and variety of 
competitors) of the construct into a single item through using a summative approach. Based on 
Figure 1, the two measures should not be tested separately. The integrative measure is generated 
via three steps. First, I identify the number of a focal firm’s competitors via the firm-product 
matrix data. I create a dummy matrix !!" where 1 indicates that firm i and j are competitors; 0 
indicates that they are not competitors. I categorize that two firms are competitors when one firm 
has more than one product market overlap with the other firm. The use of more than one overlap 
is a conservative measure as well as coherent with the attention-based consideration. The fact 
that firms have more than one market overlap forces them to pay more attention to a subset of 
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their competitors and become familiar with their strategy, capabilities, and actions (Jayachandran 
et al., 1999). Second, the variety of competitors is measured as the average distance between a 
focal firm and its competitors. I construct the distance among all firms at the dyadic level by 
examining the extent to which firms compete in the same product classes. Specifically, for any 
pair of firms, I measure the extent to which the distributions of the two firms are dissimilar from 
each other across 17 product classes (see Table 1), year by year. I ran the regression analysis and 
found the results based on 17 product classes and 68 product lines are the same. The distribution 
is captured by a multidimensional vector, !! = (!!!…  !!!), where   !!! represents the number of 
product lines that firm i competing in product class s. Distance between any pair of firms is then: 
!!" = 1 – !!!!!(!!!!!)(!!!!!) , where i ? j. The distance measure varies from 0 to 1, with a value of 1 
indicating firm i and j do not have any product market overlap. Finally, I obtain each firm’s DOF 
measure via an equation: !"#! =    !!"×!!"!!!! , where !!" is a dummy competitor matrix derived 
in step 1; !!" is a given competitor j’s distance from the focal firm i; and N is the number of 
firms.  
The model is based on three contingency variables: inside locus of convergence, 
competitors’ DOF, and firm age. For each firm, a variable denoted by inside locus of 
convergence is used as a proxy for capturing the extent to which a firm’s product markets are 
where IC is occurring. I took five steps to derive this proxy. Figure 4 demonstrates step 1-4. One, 
I transform firm-product matrices into product-product matrices year by year. Using firms’ 
product portfolio information in firm-product matrices, I create product-product matrices 
indicating the number of firms operate concurrently in any pair of products. This approach is 
consistent with Li and Greenwood’s (2004) method. That is, the relatedness between a pair of 
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markets can be measured via calculating the density of firms operating concurrently in the two 
markets. Two, in line with the statement that cross-diversification serves as a base for measuring 
the degree of IC in Figure 6, I retrieve information only from the cells in any pairs between 
voice- and data- products (!!") for operationalizing the relatedness between two industry 
respective products. Three, I generate the indicator of product convergence for each product lines 
via the equation: !! =    !!"!;!!!! . Product convergence is a vector, !! = (!!, !!, !!,…… !!"). In 
the dataset, there are 65 product lines provided by the CorpTech Directory. Four, applying Dess 
and Beard’s (1984) method, I obtain locus of convergence by using the slope coefficient of the 
regression line of time regressed against the value of product convergence (!!) for the thirteen 
years between 1991 and 2003 inclusive. This treatment considers the growth coefficient of 
product convergence in each product line. To mitigate the concern about the market size of 
individual product line, I use value 1 as a cutoff value (slope 1 means that the growth rate of 
product convergence for a given product is 100% over 13 years). The final indicator of locus of 
convergence is a dummy vector (1 represents that a given product is under IC; 0 indicates that it 
is not). I label this vector as !!(!"#). Finally, I produce the variable of inside locus of 
convergence via an equation: (!!"×  !!(!"#))!"!!!  , where !!" is an indicator of firm i’s portfolio 
diversification on 65 product lines. !!" serves as a weight for incorporating convergence 
influence on firms. The more products a firm allocates in the product markets where IC is 
occurring, the higher the value of inside locus of convergence.   
For the variable competitors’ DOF, is measured by the average of a focal firm’s 
competitors’ DOF. Firm age is measured as the difference between the firm’s founding year and 
the year in which it first entered the observation period. I then create three interaction variables 
by multiplying the three moderators with the main independent variable DOF.  
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Figure 6. Measure for Locus of Convergence 
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3.3.5 Control variables 
Perceptual DOF. Measuring managerial attention has been a challenge for researchers. 
Given the rapidly changing nature of IC and the fact that cognitive attention can shift over time, 
survey based retrospective questions is not appropriate for my context. An increasingly used 
source for measuring attention is company annual reports. The method of content analysis is 
used to calculate word counts. It is typical for companies’ executives to be involved in 
developing annual reports (Cho & Hambrick, 2006). Prior studies have shown empirical linkages 
between managerial attention captured by keywords in letters to shareholders and 10-k reports 
(Eggers & Kaplan, 2009; Nadkarni & Barr, 2008; Cho & Hambrick, 2006). Thus, for the variable 
perception-based DOF, I construct a list of keywords by looking into Telecom industry trade 
magazines and history-related materials (see Appendix C). The total number of words in 
company annual reports is counted to capture the degree to which each firm’s attention to its 
competitive landscape shift. I then normalize each firm perceptual attention by dividing the total 
number of words in each shareholder letter. Following Eggers & Kaplan’s (2009) approach, I 
calculate this perception variable as three-year decaying stock variable to capture attention 
during a window of time. I multiply the ratio by 1000 for the purpose of interpretation. The 
letters are retrieved from Mergent Online and Thompson One database.  746 letters (149 firms) 
are located. Compared to exposure-based DOF samples, this is because there are 693 reports that 
could not be obtained from libraries or the SEC database.   
Firm size is controlled by using the natural logarithm of total sales. Firm slack may also 
affect firm performance, especially when the rapid changing environment requires firm to do 
exploratory activities. I use firm cash divided by its long-term debt for this measure. A firm’s 
industry origin is used as a proxy for its internal resources and capabilities, which are key factors 
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influencing performance. Because of the heterogeneity of consumer needs and technologies, 
firms originate from one industry may carry different resources and capabilities from firms 
coming from the other industry (Lee, 2007). As noted earlier, two industry firms are different in 
the sense that one comes from a voice-origin market while the other is from a data-origin market. 
Telecommunications equipment firms (SIC: 3661, 3663 and 3669) are coded 1, while computer 
networking firms (SIC: 3576) are code 0. 
        I control for the variable of product breadth, since firms tend to diversify their 
products in a highly uncertain environment. It is calculated by the Herfindahl concentration ratio 
across the 17 categories of product markets provided by CorpTech databse: !! = 1− !!"!!"!!!  
,where !!" denotes the proportion of firm i’s total product lines categorized in class s (see 
Table1). The measure ranges from 0 to 1, with 1 indicating the highest level of product breadth.  
In addition, since the attractiveness of product markets (e.g. market growth) in which firm 
compete may affect its performance (Podolny et al., 1996), I control for this effect. Given that 
the data source is unavailable for market sales for each product line, I use the variable product 
market attractiveness operationalized as the number of competitors that a firm has divided by the 
number of products where the firm competes. The more competitors in a firm’s product lines, the 
greater the firm benefits from legitimacy effects. For example, if a firm has four products and a 
total of four competitors, the aggregated density degree would be 1.  
Since the ability to absorb learning from competitors is critical for the relationship between DOF 
and performance, this study employs two variables to control for this effect. Following prior 
research (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Phelps, 2011), I use R&D intensity (R&D expense divided 
by total sale) and patent stock (the number of telecommunication-related patents granted during 
the past four year) as proxies. Finally, I control for negative competition effects by using a 
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variable competitors’ strength measured as the average of a focal firm’s competitors’ sales. 
Consistent with prior research (Barnett, 1997), this variable control for the negative effect of 
strong competitors with abundant resources imposing on firm performance. 
3.3.6 Analysis Model 
I use cross-sectional time-series regressions with random-effect and generalized least 
square estimators (GLE). Fixed-effect models reduce degrees of freedom and potentially 
generate unstable results for a panel that has short time period (the time period per firm in my 
data ranges from 2 to 13 years). In addition, there are different assumptions between random- 
and fixed-effect models (Hsiao, 2003). Results generated from fixed-effect models cannot be 
extrapolated to a time period outside of the sample period, while random-effect model can be 
generalized to a longer time span. Thus, fixed-effect model may constrain the generalization of 
this study’s prediction. Finally, fixed-effect models would delete time variables, which prevent 
us from identifying certain years in which IC had a particular influence on my model. Including 
year effect is also advantageous, since there may be a punctuated impact on performance (e.g. 
the year when Internet bubble broke). In addition, the result of Hausman specification test 
confirms that random-effect model is more appropriate than fixed-effect model. Finally, to 
handle potential autocorrelation problems (i.e. the correlation of errors across adjacent years), I 
incorporate first-order autoregressive errors in the models. The inclusion of AR(1) autoregressive 
coefficient in the model serves as a conservative test and thus increasing confidence in the causal 
interpretation of findings.  
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3.4 RESULTS 
Table 4 reports the descriptive statistics and correlations. Since this study’s model is built 
on interaction effects and the correlations between some variables are over 0.5, I carefully check 
for multicollinearity. Variables were centered by subtracting the sample mean from the 
individual values before the interaction variables were created. The values of variance inflation 
factors (VIF) are all under the critical value (i.e. 10) and the average VIF is 2.4, thus ruling out 
multicollinearity. Figure 7 illustrates the comparison of performance trends (1991-2003) between 
firms that a deep vs. shallow focus with arbitrary values. This chart demonstrates that firms who 
consistently maintain a deep focus perform better than firms with a shallow focus. 
Figure 7. DOF and Firm Performance (1991-2003) 
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Table 5 presents the result of random-effect regression for the effect of exposure-based 
DOF on firm performance. Model 1 includes only the control and moderating variables and then 
I test the hypotheses by entering the main independent variable and each set of interaction effect 
Model 2 - 5. Model 6 reports the full model. The outcome of control variables shows that 
industry origin has significant effects on firm performance (Model 1-4: p < 0.1). Telecom 
equipment firms exhibit lower performance than computer networking firms during IC. This 
corresponds to the fact that the circuit-switching network was converged into the packet-
switching network. Telephony firms tended to protect their previous technology core and were 
likely to be blindsided and disrupted. 
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Hypothesis 1 receives support. The independent variable, DOF, has significant positive 
effects in Model 2, 3, and 5 (p < 0.01), although it is not significant in the full Model. This is 
consistent with the position regarding the necessity of understanding DOF benefits and 
challenges through a contingency model.  
In strong support of Hypothesis 2, Model 3 and 6 reveal that the positive impacts of DOF 
on firm performance is significantly reduced when the firm is inside locus of convergence 
(Model 3: β = -26.346, p < 0.05; Model 6: β = -32.98, p < 0.01), which suggests that when 
convergence hits product markets where a focal firm currently competes, the firm who has a 
shallow DOF enjoys better performance. A shallow focus allows the firm to pay more attention 
to how convergence will impact its own product markets.  
Model 4 and 6 respectively show that competitors’ DOF significantly enhances the 
positive effect of DOF on firm performance (Model 4: β = 1.709, p < 0.01; Model 6: β = 2.027, p 
< 0.01). Thus, Hypothesis 3 is supported. Competitors’ DOF assists the focal firm in enriching 
its information processing capability in exploiting DOF benefits.  
Confirming Hypothesis 4, model 5 indicates that younger firms benefit more from DOF 
than older firms (β = -0.224, p < 0.1). Established routines and inertia in older firms reduces their 
ability to resolve inertia, which inhibits initiative actions after deriving valuable information 
from a deep DOF. 
Two additional interesting results are found after I analyze the patterns across all models. 
One, examining Model 4 and Model 6, I found that when entering competitors’ DOF as a 
moderator, what is relevant for performance is the interaction effect of firm’s DOF and 
competitors’ DOF, not the main effect of firm’s DOF (see the DOF coefficients in Model 4 and 
6). This reinforces my argument with respect to the challenge of attention overload. Developing 
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a deep DOF during IC is not enough, unless a firm can enhance its ability to separate critical 
signals from the volume of noise generated via DOF. Attending to competitors which have a 
deep DOF is one solution confirmed empirically. Two, I discovered that the relative impact of 
each contingency on the relationship between DOF and firm performance is different. 
Comparing Model 3 and 6, I found that the interaction effect of age and DOF becomes weaker 
when adding other interaction effect (inside locus of convergence or competitors’ DOF). On the 
basis of the significance of the three contingencies in Model 6, the results show that the 
moderators of inside locus of convergence and competitors’ DOF have stronger impacts on DOF 
performance than the age moderator. To illustrate the two aforementioned findings, I depict the 
three interaction results using one standard deviation above and below the mean to capture high 
and low value of each moderator. Figure 8 reveals that a deep DOF does not create firm 
performance when its competitors’ DOF is shallow. This is consistent with the finding that 
overcoming attention overload is really the key in developing a deep DOF. This figure also 
exhibits that locus of convergence and competitors’ DOF have more slope difference between 
high and low level than firm age, suggesting that external moderators have more impacts on the 
DOF-performance relationship than internal factors in the context of IC. 
Figure 8. Contingencies of the DOF-Performance Relationship 
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Table 6 presents the result of random-effect regression for the effect of both exposure-
based and perception-based DOF on firm performance. The results in Model 1-5 show that the 
statistical significance pattern on H1, H2, H3, and H4 is similar to those of Table 3. This 
suggests that exposure-based DOF impacts are not influence by the introduction of perception-
based DOF and that the two DOF variables are two different constructs. The low correlation 
between perception-based and exposure-based DOF (r = 0.1) reinforces the fact that the two 
variables are in orthogonal domains. Interestingly, Model 6 reveals that the interaction of 
perception-based and exposure-based DOF has a strongly significant effect on performance (β = 
7.753, p < 0.001). Taken together, the two variables should not be integrated into one construct. 
To examine whether there is inter-temporal relationship between perception-based and exposure-
based DOF, I lagged exposure-based DOF and regress it on perception-based DOF to see if 
exposure attention serves as a filter to frame a firm’s perceptional attention on the environment. 
However, the result shows no significance. 
I performed several analyses to assess the sensitivity and robustness of the results. I test if 
different industry origin changes the results. DOF benefits for firms in the industry where their 
fundamental technology were being substituted (telecom equipment firms) may be different from 
for firms in the industry where their fundamental technology were substituting another (computer 
networking firms). I decomposed data into two sets by industry origin: telecom equipment and 
computer networking firms. I found no significantly different patterns between telecom 
equipment and computer networking firms. A reasonable speculation is that during IC the two 
industry firms gradually become indistinguishable since these firms’ cross-industry 
diversification blurs their previous industry identity. Therefore, it is appropriate to pool the two 
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types of firms in the dataset. In addition, the empirical results include firms that operate in only 
one product line. This case may raise a concern that the reason why firms could not benefit from 
DOF is simply that they do not have resources to deepen DOF. I therefore excluded this kind of 
firm from the sample set and reran the analysis, but find no qualitatively different results. 
Finally, since the mechanism of the DOF model is based on benefit/challenge arguments, one 
alternative model specification on the relationship between DOF and performance would be 
curvilinear. I made an effort by checking the square term effect of DOF on performance. I did 
not find significant results. This suggests that during IC a firm’s performance neither 
increasingly drops nor enhances as it deepens its DOF from a moderate to a high level. Hence, a 
linear relationship is a better fit for my model. An interesting extension would be to test if the 
curvilinear impact of DOF on performance is more appropriate in other settings than in the IC 
context, such as the relatively boundary-stable industries. 
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3.5 DISCUSSION 
The purpose of the present work is to examine the performance linkage of firms’ depth of 
field during IC by proposing a contingency framework. Overall, a firm’s deep DOF contributes 
to its performance during IC. Furthermore, I found that the performance benefit of a deep DOF is 
weakened when convergence occurs in product markets where a firm competes, when most of its 
competitors have a shallow DOF, and when the firm is relatively old. This study contributes to 
literature in several unique ways.  
First, this paper adds to the intersection of industry evolution and organizational attention 
literature by advancing the construct of DOF. Explanations of firm performance during industry 
changes have been developed on the basis of two views that progressed independently: industry 
structure (Scherer & Ross, 1990) and organizational attention (Daft & Weick, 1984; Bogner & 
Barr, 2000). Although a few of recent studies begun to connect the two lines of research 
(Nadkarni & Barr, 2008; Nadkarni & Narayanan, 2007), they mainly focus on cognition-based 
attention. This paper sheds an insight on the performance predicator of firms under industry 
changes by bridging the gap between the two research streams from a different angle those 
pioneering studies. As Ocasio (1997) pointed out, theories of attention have deemphasized the 
role of structure (how the composition of context affects organizational attention). In Simon’s 
(1947) seminal work, structure plays an equally important role as cognition does. In this paper, 
the exposure-base DOF construct is ground at the structure view of social psychology. DOF has 
a dual emphasis on a focal firm’s and its competitors’ product market configuration. In other 
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words, a deep focus is a joint outcome of the firm and competitors’ market entry decisions. DOF, 
therefore, is particularly important in the dynamic context of IC where industry boundaries 
coevolve with firm boundaries. A deep focus puts a firm in a position that draws its attention to 
multiple different competitors simultaneously and helps to appreciate more complex and 
sometimes contradictory interpretation of what the changing competitive landscape means. 
Consistent with Tsai et al. (2011), this paper holds a view that firms should carefully and 
dynamically manage their market configuration and enter product markets that are of strategic 
significance for exposure to many dissimilar competitors during IC.  
In a HBR interview (Fryer & Stewart, 2008), Cisco’s CEO (John Chambers) share how 
he was able to read market trends before anyone else did through his childhood experience and a 
lesson learnt from battling with IBM. At the time Cisco became the dominant player in computer 
network, equipment makers only competed with other equipment makers, while software firms 
competed with other software firms. Competing in both of these markets allowed Cisco to move 
more quickly with cutting-edge developments than its rivals that compete only in the equipment 
business. While this purpose of this paper is not to examine where a firm’s deep focus comes 
from (i.e. how a firm knows which of product markets can deepen its DOF), studying the 
antecedents of firms’ DOF is a fruitful area of future research. 
It is useful to use DOF data to take a closer look at the Cisco’s case. Table 7 illustrates 
the changes of Cisco’s DOF across time. In 1991, Cisco only had one major multimarket 
competitor, MICROCOM. In 1995, because of product market expansion, it encountered 14 
competitors. At this point, Cisco’s competitor variety was 0.393 and DOF was 5.502 (14 x 
0.393). In 2002, Cisco had established a deep DOF (20.628) through exposing to 54 competitors 
(see Table 7: the competitor variety score ranges from 0.86 to 0.15). The data implies that 
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Cisco’s top management team had a vision as to where to meet diverse competitors. According 
to Figure 9, Cisco had established market presence in voice-related segments in 1995 and 
software-related products in 2002. The two strategic moves enabled the company to expose 
numerous different competitors, thus deepening DOF. Here is another interesting finding. In 
Figure 9, 3COM’ distance to Cisco in 1995 was 0.454, while the distance in 2002 decreased to 
0.178. This is consistent with my earlier argument that DOF is the joint outcome of a focal firm’s 
and its competitors product configuration. The value of 0.178 suggests that Cisco and 3COM had 
become similar to each other in 2002. Cisco would not have been able to sustain a deep DOF if it 
diversified into the same product markets as competitors did. 
The contingency model also makes a contribution to organizational attention theory by 
resolving the tension between the limitation of organizational attention scarcity and the requisite 
for attention breadth. Because of limited capacity, managers attend to a few specific issues that 
they consider crucial, and then allocate attention to other issues subsequently (Cyert & March, 
1963). Recent behavioral theory of the firm’s studies kept sharpening our knowledge of 
sequential attention (Greve, 2008; Iyer & Miller, 2008; Vissa et al., 2010). Indeed, sequential 
attention has the values of attention stability and quality for firms (Rerup, 2011) and prevents 
firms from recognizing emerging and/or peripheral issues that may change its environment. IC is 
an appropriate context for investigating how firms can reconcile this tension. Evidences of this 
paper provide a managerial implication that firms need to optimize their DOF according to the 
locus of IC as well as competitors’ focus depth. In fact, attending toward specific issue (a 
shallow focus) still has its own value especially when firm is within the locus of convergence. 
On the other hand, a deep focus may backfire firm performance when it attends to a lot of 
shallow-focus competitors. As far as firm age is concerned, the results reveal that performance 
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effect of a firm’s attention toward multiple different competitors would vary in different points in 
the firm’s age. Older firms derive less benefit from a deep focus than younger firms. The result 
should be carefully interpreted within the context of IC. Firm age represents the length of time 
that the firm has experienced the pre-convergence environment, which becomes a liability when 
the firm attempts to filter in and assimilate a large amount and wide range of competitors’ move 
information 
Figure 7. Cisco’s DOF in the 1990s 
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Figure 9. Cisco’s Product Portfolio in the 1990s 
   
.           
Third, this paper extends IC research by providing a measure for investigating the degree 
of IC via conceptualizing the notion of locus of convergence. Prior research mostly assumes that 
there is only one product market for each industry undergoing convergence (Greenstein & 
Khanna, 1997). My operationalization relaxes the single product market assumption (Klepper & 
Thompson, 2006) and illustrates a nuanced and novel approach of assessing the extent of IC. 
Operationalization of IC has been a bottleneck in IC studies and therefore most studies have been 
qualitative and descriptive in nature. With this empirical indicator, one can explore various kinds 
of IC dynamics, including rate, turbulence, and asymmetry. Locus of convergence therefore 
serves as a foundation for future studies on the above three facets of IC. Another value of locus 
of convergence is that IC becomes testable and can be linked with the antecedents of IC. As 
noted earlier, the process aspect of IC receives little attention. One promising avenue is to 
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connect industry convergence with technology convergence, which has been viewed as one of 
IC’s triggers. The convergence literature has developed measures indicating the extent to which 
firms are involved in technology convergence by using the patent co-citation data across 
industries (Avenel et al., 2007; Gambardella & Torrisi, 1998). Researchers can examine how the 
extent of IC varies due to different types of technology convergence. Finally, assembling maps 
of locus of convergence longitudinally allow managers to develop an understanding of a 
dynamic view of IC. 
My results should be viewed in light of several limitations. First, as mentioned in 
Appendix A, I develop the DOF theory of firm performance by focusing on one type of IC. One 
future research direction could be to integrate the categorization of IC with this paper by asking a 
question: do different types of IC affect the utility of DOF. Second, I recognize that the notion of 
DOF rests on the assumption that the understanding of newly developed patterns in the 
competitive landscape should be accurate. An emerging line of managerial cognition research 
shows that the way firms interpret their environment, such as controllability and 
positive/negative expectation, is more important than how accurately they know their 
environments (Sutcliffe & Weber, 2003). For instance, future studies can decompose DOF into 
perceptual accuracy and interpretation (i.e. how they frame new situations) about firm’s 
competitive environment and then test the relative impact on performance. Finally, generalizing 
this study’s framework and the DOF argument to other industries is important. Other kinds of 
industry evolution, such as industry-level vertical (de)integration, would be ideal for studying the 
generalizability of my findings. 
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4.0  EPILOGUE 
In conclusion, I developed one framework for the understanding of how firms use alliance 
experience and initial acquisition to resolve uncertainties brought by IC. I also illustrated a 
promising construct of DOF for explaining firm performance difference during IC. The two 
essays made contributions to a growing body of alliance-acquisition relationship research as well 
as the industry change literature. Further extensions of these ideas will enrich theory about IC 
and will provide managers with important insight on how to avoid competitive blindspots and 
discover entrepreneurial opportunities in the world of convergence. 
As Hamel and Prahalad (1996: 240) suggest, our industrialized society has shifted toward 
a new economy in which many industries are in “a state of flux”. Nevertheless, the theorizing 
regarding IC has been under-developed for over a decade. The moral of my story is that IC is one 
of important topics for managers in the 21st century. The era of convergence is upon us; it is thus 
and opportune time to create an impactful research agenda. 
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APPENDIX A: WHAT INDUSTRY CONVERGENCE MEANS 
While this paper is not to resolve the complex set of issues involving the definitions and 
classifications of IC, it is important to provide a conceptual backdrop that serves as a boundary 
condition for this study.  In doing so, I embrace the conceptualization of multiple types of IC. 
Building on prior research (Christensen, 2011; McGahan, 2004; Pennings & Puranam, 2000), I 
provide a synthesis highlighting two dimensions: interdependence and triggers (see Figure 10). 
Interdependence is defined as the form of mutuality between two industries.  There are two 
forms of interdependence underlying convergence.  IC can be substitution-based when 
consumers consider a product in one industry interchangeable with another industry’s product or 
complementarity-based when users consider that products work better together than separately 
(Greenstein & Khanna, 1997). Substitution-based IC typically renews existing industry 
structures. Digital imaging technology has restructured the photo equipment and consumer 
electronics industry structures by involving devices that take and process pictures using 
electronics instead of film. Complementarity-based IC creates new market/industries. The 
combination of drug and device technologies have created several new markets such as drug-
coated devices and drug delivery devices where new products deliver drugs directly into human 
bodies, providing greater efficiency and therapeutic effect than oral forms of drug delivery. 
From the triggers or antecedent perspective, IC can be initiated due to supply- or 
demand-side factors (Pennings & Puranam, 2000). One the supply side, technology convergence 
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has been recognized as a cause of IC. McGahan (2004) suggests the use of core asset (e.g. 
technology, product or know-how) and core activity (e.g. purchasing, operation or distribution) 
for analyzing industry evolution. Because her approach considers a wide variety of firm-related 
IC antecedents, I classify it as a supply-side antecedent. Supply-side antecedents are the 
convergence of core asset and activity either acting independently or in combination.  On the 
demand side, convergence can be the result of consumers perceiving products from different 
industries functionally similar or complementary. Adner (2002) posits that while technological 
disruption can explain the reason why the distinction between the impacted markets becomes 
blurred, how consumer evaluate the technology plays an equally important role. 
Figure 10. Taxonomy of Industry Convergence 
 
Note: Adapted from prior research on IC (Christensen, 2011, McGahan, 2004, Pennings & Puranam, 2000) 
 
 
Combining the two dimensions generates four types of IC: supply substitution, supply 
integration, demand homogenization and demand integration (see Figure 7). In supply 
substitution, convergence is initiated when the core asset/activity bases of two or more industries 
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become similar in the sense that they can satisfy the same set of needs. Research on converging 
technologies (Rosenberg, 1976) and general-purposed technologies (Bresnahan & Trajtenberg, 
1995) are illustrations of this type of IC. In the early 2000s, firms’ abilities to manipulate the 
genetic codes of living things led to the convergence of the agriculture, chemical, and 
pharmaceutical industry (Enriquez and Goldberg, 2000). When a chemical company, such as 
Monsanto and DuPont invent genetically modified seeds and sell to farmers, they become 
agricultural companies’ competitors. In supply integration, convergence occurs when the 
different industry core asset/activities are brought together to create new kinds of industries, 
markets or products. Kodama’s (1992) technology fusion concept is an example. For instance, 
the semiconductor, biotech and nanotech IC has recently created one new sector (Hacklin, 2008). 
In demand integration, convergence is driven by the fact that there is a need from the 
customer’s side for one stop shopping, a concept related to product bundling in the marketing 
literature (Prasad, Venkatesh, and Mahajan, 2011). A notable example is the convergence of 
cellular telephony and the computer industry. One of the main reasons that the smart phone 
market has taken off is that consumers desire devices that can satisfy mobile social networking 
needs (e.g. Facebook, Twitter). The fourth type, demand homogenization is reflected in the 
growing similarity of needs across groups of consumers that relate one industry to another. For 
instance, while consumers used to think of PC and TV as serving different purposes, there are 
more and more people considering them as substitutes for one another, which facilitate the 
convergence between personal computer and TV industry. Note that demand homogenization 
may or may not be driven by the advent of supply substitution. For example, the case of genetic 
modification convergence in supply substitution is currently facing a barrier regarding how to 
manage the public’s opposition and fear to genetic foods.   
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Given that the literature is still emerging I focus on one type of IC (supply substitution) 
for the sake of theoretical and empirical clarity but also because it is important and interesting in 
its own right. 
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APPENDIX B: TELECOM INDUSTRY CONTEXT 
How did voice-data convergence exactly influence the Telecom and PC networking 
industries? To answer this question, one needs to understand how their industry infrastructure 
(the way communication systems are connected) was fundamentally changed in the 1990s. I 
leverage Fransman (2002)’s layer model to explain this fundamental transformation (see Figure 
8). His model is developed on the basis on OSI (Open Systems Interconnection) concept – a 
prescription of characterizing and standardizing the functions of a communications system in 
terms of abstraction layers. Similar communication functions are grouped into the same layers. A 
layer serves the layer above it and is served by the layer below it. 
In 1980s, the Telecom industry infrastructure is based on a simple three-layer model. 
These layers were vertically integrated within a few telecom operators. Thus, the engine of 
innovation of telecom equipment was located in these monopolies’ R&D laboratories (e.g. 
AT&T’s Bell Laboratories and BT’s Martlesham Laboratories) which played the key role of 
implementing new generations of switches, transmission system equipment. Given high vertical 
integration, telecom operators were able to create a closed innovation system characterized as 
high entry barriers. Also, under this system, the innovation process was slow and sequential. This 
feature fits well with the circuit-switch network which requires a extremely high degree of 
reliability. Equipment failure could lead to the entire network shut down. 
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Figure 11. The Telecom Industry Infrastructure Change in the 1990s 
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In the 1990s, the advent of IP (one generic Internet technology including packet-
switching technology and the World Wide Web) transformed the Telecom industry in two ways. 
It makes communication across a diverse of networks possible. This enlarges the size of each 
layer. More importantly, IP allows the layers above IP interface to operate separated from the 
layers below IP interface. Using one example of IP technologies (i.e. digital switch), Figure 11 
illustrates how that works. Digital switches are the devices controlling the process and 
interacting other systems. Out-of-band signaling system is one type of networks under digital 
 90 
switch concept (Sterling et al., 2006). Traditionally, within in-band signaling system, the call and 
information about the call travelled in the same path. This limited space for information. It was 
also an inefficient since it occupied the whole call path. In out-of-band signaling, the call and 
information about the call travel over different paths. As the Figure 9 shows, the call traveled in 
the regular telephony network, information about the call went through a separate packet-
switched data network. With digital switch, Telecom operators could offer more new services in 
a creative and less costly way. 
Just like the example in Figure 11, many new types of communication networks linking 
people became possible, and yet they could continue to operate in the traditional telephony 
network. Three new layers emerged (see Layer 3, 4, and 5 in Figure 8) in the 1990s. The change 
of communication layers has important implications for understanding the evolution of the 
Telecom industry. IP facilitated the division of labor in knowledge creation, thus reducing the 
incentives for telecom operators to include equipment (Layer 1 in the 1980s) within their 
organizations. Therefore, Layer 1 (in the 1990s) was outsourced to specialized equipment makers 
(e.g. Lucent, Nortel). IP also lowered entry barriers of telecom equipment by bring firms from 
computer industries previously considered to be separate from the Telecom industry. Finally, 
newly emerged layers (Layer 3-5) in the 1990s further nurtured the demand for Layer 1 and 2. 
While the empirical setting of this paper focuses on firms in Layer 1, Figure 12 suggests that the 
viability of Layer 1 is highly dependent on the other four layers. From a retrospective view, we 
have already known that the Telecom industry underwent boom and bust during the 1991-2003 
period. However, for managers facing those infrastructure changes “within” that period, they 
have limited knowledge of how the new industry worked, how it was changing, and what would 
happen to key parameters in each of layers and the extent of new entry. Managers’ knowledge is 
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embodied in their understanding of the business landscape. The DOF construct introduced in this 
paper helps to explain how firms cope with this industry change.  
Figure 12. Digital Switch 
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APPENDIX C: MEASURING ATTENTION TOWARD LANDSCAPE SHIFT 
I establish a list of words to measure firm attention by using CEO letters to shareholders. 
One may concern that those letters may not communicate firms’ actual views to shareholders, 
either because it is the public relation department (not CEO) who addresses something that 
financial institutions prefer to know. The first case is unlikely because all letters were sent out 
under CEO signature and closely edited by them (Cho & Hambrick, 2006). Figure 13 shows the 
words associated with CEOs’ perception on their landscape. These words are categorized into 
three groups: technology-related, product-market-related, and convergence in general. 
Figure 13. List of Words Measuring Attention to Landscape Shift 
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